SUMMARY OF
KEMIRA OY AND IMPERIAL CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES PLC: A REPORT
ON THE PROPOSED MERGER
In July 1990 Kemira Oy (Kemira), a Finnish company,
agreed in principle to acquire from Imperial Chemical Industries PLC
(ICI) its United Kingdom business in the manufacture and sale of solid
and liquid agricultural fertilisers. We were asked to investigate and
report on the proposed merger (see Appendix 1.1).
There are three major fertiliser manufacturers in the
United Kingdom, which account for two-thirds of supplies to the market:
ICI with about 29 per cent; Kemira with 18 per cent; and Hydro Fertilizers
Ltd (Hydro Fertilizers), a Norwegian-owned company, with 19 per cent.
The remaining supplies are accounted for largely by imports, either directly
or through blenders. These are fragmented, with no company having more
than a small share.
Kemira and Norsk Hydro (the parent company of Hydro
Fertilizers) are also the leading fertiliser manufacturers in Western
Europe, having market shares of approximately 12 per cent and 18 per
cent respectively. Kemira is wholly owned by the Finnish Government,
while the Norwegian Government has just over 50 per cent of the equity
of Norsk Hydro.
There is vigorous competition among the three major
manufacturers and between them and imports. The availability of cheap
imports from Eastern Europe (founded on cheap, subsidised natural gas
supplies from Russia) and from oil-producing countries has had a depressing
effect on fertiliser prices in the United Kingdom and Western Europe
generally. Moreover demand flattened from the mid-1980s after a long
period of strong growth. These factors have caused significant overcapacity
in the United Kingdom and in Western Europe generally.
There are indications that, due to political and economic
developments in Eastern Europe, as well as in the Gulf, imported supplies
will no longer be as competitive as hitherto. Moreover, steps have been
taken and will continue to be taken to reduce capacity in both the United
Kingdom and elsewhere in Western Europe, bringing production more into
balance with capacity. Accordingly, we believe that world prices will
harden and the pressures created by excess supply will ease.
The effect of the merger would be that Kemira, already
the third largest supplier to the United Kingdom market, would acquire
the largest supplier and become market leader. We believe Kemira's share
would be upwards of 40 per cent and could rise well above this if imports
were to slacken. With modern production facilities in the United Kingdom
and a strong position in Western Europe as a whole Kemira would be well
placed to exploit this market leadership. Kemira's commitment to the
fertiliser industry, coupled with its state ownership, could lead it
to take a longer-term view while importers were squeezed by short-term
market pressures.
The sale would reduce the number of manufacturers from
three to two, holding between them some two-thirds of the market, with
other suppliers having small shares, and with little prospect of new
entry in manufacturing. The merger would therefore bring a significant
reduction in competition in the United Kingdom market. We conclude that
the merger may be expected to operate against the public interest.
If the merger were not to proceed there is a real prospect
that ICI would sooner or later withdraw from the fertiliser market, closing
its plants, with a loss of employment and of domestic productive capacity.
This would be an adverse consequence but we did not consider that it
outweighed the detriment to competition arising from the merger. We nevertheless
explored whether there were appropriate remedies (other than outright
prevention of the merger) which might sufficiently limit the reduction
in competition.
In our view, however, these alternatives would not offset
the detrimental effects on competition, and we have accordingly recommended
that the proposed merger should not proceed.
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Last Revised: June 1999
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