Kemira Oy and Imperial Chemical Industries PLC: A
report on the proposed merger
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Summary
In July 1990 Kemira Oy (Kemira), a Finnish company, agreed in principle
to acquire from Imperial Chemical Industries PLC (ICI) its United Kingdom
business in the manufacture and sale of solid and liquid agricultural
fertilisers. We were asked to investigate and report on the proposed merger
(see Appendix 1.1).
There are three major fertiliser manufacturers in the United Kingdom,
which account for two-thirds of supplies to the market: ICI with about
29 per cent; Kemira with 18 per cent; and Hydro Fertilizers Ltd (Hydro
Fertilizers), a Norwegian-owned company, with 19 per cent. The remaining
supplies are accounted for largely by imports, either directly or through
blenders. These are fragmented, with no company having more than a small
share.
Kemira and Norsk Hydro (the parent company of Hydro Fertilizers) are
also the leading fertiliser manufacturers in Western Europe, having market
shares of approximately 12 per cent and 18 per cent respectively. Kemira
is wholly owned by the Finnish Government, while the Norwegian Government
has just over 50 per cent of the equity of Norsk Hydro.
There is vigorous competition among the three major manufacturers and
between them and imports. The availability of cheap imports from Eastern
Europe (founded on cheap, subsidised natural gas supplies from Russia)
and from oil-producing countries has had a depressing effect on fertiliser
prices in the United Kingdom and Western Europe generally. Moreover demand
flattened from the mid-1980s after a long period of strong growth. These
factors have caused significant overcapacity in the United Kingdom and
in Western Europe generally.
There are indications that, due to political and economic developments
in Eastern Europe, as well as in the Gulf, imported supplies will no longer
be as competitive as hitherto. Moreover, steps have been taken and will
continue to be taken to reduce capacity in both the United Kingdom and
elsewhere in Western Europe, bringing production more into balance with
capacity. Accordingly, we believe that world prices will harden and the
pressures created by excess supply will ease.
The effect of the merger would be that Kemira, already the third largest
supplier to the United Kingdom market, would acquire the largest supplier
and become market leader. We believe Kemira's share would be upwards of
40 per cent and could rise well above this if imports were to slacken.
With modern production facilities in the United Kingdom and a strong position
in Western Europe as a whole Kemira would be well placed to exploit this
market leadership. Kemira's commitment to the fertiliser industry, coupled
with its state ownership, could lead it to take a longer-term view while
importers were squeezed by short-term market pressures.
The sale would reduce the number of manufacturers from three to two,
holding between them some two-thirds of the market, with other suppliers
having small shares, and with little prospect of new entry in manufacturing.
The merger would therefore bring a significant reduction in competition
in the United Kingdom market. We conclude that the merger may be expected
to operate against the public interest.
If the merger were not to proceed there is a real prospect that ICI
would sooner or later withdraw from the fertiliser market, closing its
plants, with a loss of employment and of domestic productive capacity.
This would be an adverse consequence but we did not consider that it outweighed
the detriment to competition arising from the merger. We nevertheless
explored whether there were appropriate remedies (other than outright
prevention of the merger) which might sufficiently limit the reduction
in competition.
In our view, however, these alternatives would not offset the detrimental
effects on competition, and we have accordingly recommended that the proposed
merger should not proceed.
Full text
Contents
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Chapters
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| Chapter
1 |
Summary |
| Chapter
2 |
The companies involved and the merger situation |
| Chapter
3 |
The market |
| Chapter
4 |
The views of the main parties |
| Chapter
5 |
The views of other parties |
| Chapter
6 |
Conclusions |
| |
List of signatories |
| Glossary |
|
Appendices
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| (The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
The reference |
| 2.1 |
Corporate structure of Kemira's fertiliser and associated
business in the United Kingdom |
| 2.2 |
Kemira Group: summary analysis of 1989 capital employed,
net sales and profit |
| 2.3 |
Kemira Group: financial results and key financial figures
for 1985 to 1989, International Accounting Standards basis |
| 2.4 |
ICI Group: segmented analysis of 1989 capital employed,
turnover and trading profit |
| 3.1 |
Customer survey |
| 4.1 |
Article from the Helsingin Sanomat of 25 April 1986 |
| 5.1 |
Statement of policy by the Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry |
| 5.2 |
Extract from a letter of 25 September 1990 from Competition
Policy Division, DTI, to the MMC |
| 5.3 |
Finnish Government guidelines for state-owned companies |
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