British Aerospace PLC and Thompson-CSF SA: A report
on the proposed merger
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Summary
British Aerospace plc (BAe) and Thomson-CSF SA (Thomson-CSF) have agreed
to merge their guided weapons businesses into a joint company, owned equally
between them and to be known as Eurodynamics.
BAe leads by far in the guided weapons (GW) sector in the United Kingdom,
while Thomson-CSF is in competition in France with two other major companies.
At present the capacities of BAe and Thomson-CSF are largely complementary.
On 19 September 1990 the Secretary of State referred the proposals for
a joint company to the MMC (see Appendix 1.1) to determine whether they
created a merger situation qualifying for investigation and, if so, whether
they would operate against the public interest. The Secretary of State
noted in a press statement at the time that concerns arose over the ownership
of Thomson-CSF's parent, Thomson SA, by the French Government and the
latter's control or influence over other defence companies, as well as
on competition grounds.
We have considered the proposed merger against the background of current
trends in the defence industry: falling demand and growing overcapacity;
increasingly sophisticated and expensive technologies; breakdown of national
markets and internationalisation of procurement through consortia; introduction
of competitive procedures for the award of contracts by the Ministry of
Defence (MOD) in the United Kingdom. As these developments spread throughout
Europe, the major participants in the industry will increasingly have
to join together to compete. Eurodynamics is a response to those trends.
Competition in the GW market is possible at two levels: prime contracting
and subcontracting. So far as prime contracting is concerned, we have
had no evidence that the merger may be expected to give rise to adverse
effects.
There are several United Kingdom companies engaged in subcontracting,
which is an important sector of the GW business. The issue that has concerned
us is that following the merger these companies should still be able to
compete. Fears were expressed to us that where BAe or Thomson-CSF had
the capacity for subcontracting elsewhere within their respective businesses,
or within the divisions that they were transferring into Eurodynamics,
Eurodynamics would be unlikely to allow independent subcontractors a fair
chance.
We believe that the merger will introduce a new competitive element
into the market. Competition will be stimulated. It is in the interest
of BAe and Thomson-CSF themselves that Eurodynamics should award subcontracts
as competitively as possible, and should not appear to make subcontracts
impossible for independent firms to win. BAe will be alert to ensure that
it does not suffer disadvantage as a shareholder through contracts being
awarded uncompetitively. Moreover, the subcontracting firms themselves
belong to major industrial groups. They could make profitable joint arrangements
with other European contractors. The MOD also has procedures to promote
competition in the business. We conclude, on balance, that the proposed
merger would not give rise to adverse effects so far as United Kingdom
subcontracting is concerned.
As for the control or influence of the French Government, the position
is that Thomson SA, which is almost wholly owned by the state, has a shareholding
of almost 60 per cent in Thomson-CSF. Powers exist for the Government
to intervene in the management of Thomson-CSF, should it see the need.
We acknowledge that circumstances could arise in which it could and would
intervene. We do not foresee such circumstances today. Thomson-CSF, which
was nationalised in 1982, has been managed in a commercial manner, and
has rationalised its business drastically to achieve profit. It appears
to have kept the Ministries with which it has to deal at arm's length
from its day-to-day business. It has competed strongly in the domestic
and international markets, and with other state-controlled companies as
much as with private ones. The nature of its control by the state is complicated
by the fact that (like any other defence company, publicly or privately
owned) its only domestic customer is the French MOD.
State control appears in this instance to be attenuated in several ways.
It is indirect, through the parent company, Thomson SA. Thomson-CSF's
equity capital is 40 per cent privately owned, and quoted internationally.
The state is interested in the survival of its defence companies generally,
not merely those publicly owned. The merger is not a takeover, but a joint
venture between equals. The United Kingdom market, like the French market,
would to a large extent be dictated by a sole customer. We consider it
unlikely, in all these circumstances, that the market would be distorted
by the fact of state control over Thomson-CSF, or by the fact of state
control over several defence companies in France.
We conclude that the proposed arrangements would not be against the
public interest.
Full text
Contents
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Chapters
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| Chapter
1 |
Summary |
| Chapter
2 |
The companies involved, and the merger proposal |
| Chapter
3 |
The markets affected by the merger |
| Chapter
4 |
Views of other parties |
| Chapter
5 |
Views of the main parties |
| Chapter
6 |
Conclusions |
| |
List of signatories |
| Glossary |
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Appendices
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| (The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
Conduct of the inquiry |
| 2.1 |
The development of BAe |
| 2.2 |
Financial information on BAe |
| 2.3 |
Financial information on Thompson-CSF |
| 4.1 |
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry's statement
of 26 July 1990 on merger reference policy |
| 4.2 |
Extract from letter of 25 September 1990 from CP Division
DTI, to the MMC |
| 4.3 |
Translation of written evidence from the French Government |
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