Sligos SA and Signet Ltd: A report on the proposed
merger
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Summary
Signet Ltd (Signet), one of the two largest processors of payment card
transactions in the United Kingdom, has been put up for sale by its owners,
Lloyds Bank, Midland Bank, National Westminster Bank and The Royal Bank
of Scotland. After consideration of other bids, the vendors' choice was
narrowed down to two firms: First Data Resources Ltd (FDRL) which is ultimately
owned by American Express, and Sligos SA (Sligos), a French subsidiary
of the state-controlled bank, Crédit Lyonnais SA (Crédit
Lyonnais).
On 24 October 1990 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry referred
Sligos's bid to this Commission, for investigation and report. The Secretary
of State noted in a press statement at the time that since the sale of
Signet would lead to the creation of the largest third party processor
of payment cards in the United Kingdom, the implications of its coming
under the control of a state-controlled company raised issues of public
interest which warranted investigation by this Commission.
At a late stage in our inquiry, Signet's owners told us that they had
decided to negotiate in detail with FDRL. However, in case these negotiations
do not succeed, and the owners wish to turn to Sligos instead, Sligos
is continuing with its bid. We have therefore to complete our investigation
and report.
While Signet enjoys a substantial share of the payment card processing
market, Sligos has not hitherto had any business in the United Kingdom.
The merger would not therefore cause any increase in market share in the
United Kingdom.
The business of card processing is expanding, and the customers of card
processors are themselves becoming more cost-conscious and selective because
of the increased competition which they themselves face. Several new firms,
both domestic and foreign, have recently entered the market. The barriers
to new entry are not so high as to deter major firms, especially as it
is possible to start on quite a small scale, and exit costs can be low,
since much expenditure can be recovered.
No concern was expressed to us during our inquiry concerning Sligos's
possible acquisition of Signet, except in relation to the potential effects
of state control. Two banks, both engaged in processing themselves, were
worried that Sligos might exploit its position in the market through being
able, as a subsidiary of a state-controlled bank, to take longer-term
decisions than its competitors. However, as we found in our inquiry into
Crédit Lyonnais and Woodchester Investments, in practice the French
authorities accord a high degree of independence to the management of
banks directly under state control and expect them to operate commercially.
This is particularly the case in respect of activities outside France.
There is even less reason for supposing that they would be likely to interfere,
indirectly, in the United Kingdom activities of Sligos, a subsidiary of
Crédit Lyonnais. It is also the policy of Crédit Lyonnais
to give the managements of its subsidiaries freedom to run their businesses,
and Sligos told us that it follows the same principle with its own subsidiaries.
We do not believe that, if Signet's business under Sligos's ownership
were to run into trouble, Crédit Lyonnais and still less the French
authorities-would step in with any assistance that could not be justified
on the standard financial criteria prevailing in the private sector.
We do not consider that Signet under Sligos would have the market strength,
with or without state control, to benefit from anti-competitive practices.
If it attempted to do so, major customers could take their processing
in-house; or they, and smaller customers, could turn to one of the increasing
number of third party processors. Signet's position in the market is not
as strong as might be supposed from its large market share: it owes the
latter entirely to the business of its present shareholders, the four
banks, who would only be committed to Signet for up to about five years
after its sale, and that probably on a declining scale. After that period,
Signet would have to compete to keep the four banks' custom.
We conclude that the proposed merger may be expected not to operate
against the public interest.
Full text
Contents
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Chapters
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| Chapter
1 |
Summary |
| Chapter
2 |
The companies involved, and the merger situation |
| Chapter
3 |
The market for card processing services |
| Chapter
4 |
The views of other parties |
| Chapter
5 |
The views of the main parties |
| Chapter
6 |
Conclusions |
| |
List of signatories |
| Glossary |
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Appendices
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| (The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
The reference and the conduct of the inquiry |
| 2.1 |
Sligos: consolidated balance sheets |
| 2.2 |
Sligos: consolidated profit and loss accounts |
| 2.3 |
Sligos: historical cost financial statistics |
| 2.4 |
Signet: summarised balance sheets |
| 4.1 |
Extract from letter dated 25 September 1990 from the
DTI |
| 4.2 |
Statement of Policy by the Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry |
| 4.3 |
Reply of the French Ministry of the Economy, Finance
and Budget to the MMC's request for information |
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