London Underground Limited: A report on passenger and other services supplied by the company

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Summary

On 30 October 1990 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry referred to the Commission certain questions concerning the efficiency and costs of and the service provided by London Underground Limited (LUL) in supplying passenger and other services (see Appendix 1.1). LUL is a wholly-owned subsidiary company of London Regional Transport (LRT) which is closely involved in LUL's affairs. For example, LRT receives Government grant for public transport in London and apportions LUL's share to the company, and in consultation with the Government, it determines LUL's fares policy. We were grateful for LRT's and LUL's complete cooperation in the inquiry.

We discuss here the main issues arising from the reference which required a wide-ranging inquiry covering most aspects of LUL's affairs. A summary of our recommendations appears at the end of the report in Chapter 15. We indicate priorities for action in paragraph 1.47.

Performance

The public's perception of an erratic, overcrowded and poorly maintained service in many areas is broadly correct, although the picture for the Underground as a whole is more favourable. For the most part the deficiencies in the levels of service are the result of chronic underinvestment in both new capacity and the replacement and renewal of existing assets, an unforeseen dramatic growth in traffic and the disruption arising from radically improved safety provisions. Even with unlimited availability of investment funds the time-scale for any marked alleviation of overcrowding would not be felt for a long time because it would require the construction of new lines, and these take 15 years or so from conception to completion. One such line, East­West crossrail, from Paddington to Liverpool Street has been approved by the Secretary of State for Transport. LUL believes that a Chelsea­Hackney Line will also be necessary if congestion is to be substantially reduced and the Secretary of State is safeguarding this route. Meanwhile LUL expects that significant levels of regular inconvenience and discomfort will continue to be suffered by passengers as demand grows. At a less visible but nevertheless critical level, LUL estimates that it will take at least ten years to bring its permanent way up to standard, and this is on the uncertain assumption that the necessary funds will be available. On a more encouraging note there is the prospect of a reduction in disruptions resulting from smoke alarms when LUL's safety programme is complete (see paragraphs 14.121 and 14.123).

LUL set four Business Goals in June 1990:

(a) The maximum number of trains to be running in the peak, at regular intervals, by end of September 1990. This meant single figure cancellations for the network as a whole.

(b) An escalator service to meet customer expectations by April 1991. This meant no more than 35 escalators out for any reason. Emphasis was to be placed on minimising the downtime of individual machines.

(c) A welcoming and customer-friendly environment by April 1991. This had implications for cleanliness, staff presence and attitudes, technology and policing.

(d) Asset maintenance and renewal so that the system performed well and looked good. This would be a five-year programme covering track, signalling, escalators, stations and trains.

LUL has failed so far to meet the first goal because of particular problems with rolling stock on the Victoria and Piccadilly Lines. LUL believes that financial constraints will continue to make it difficult to achieve although we note that LUL has been close to it in some months. The second goal has been achieved by LUL, but it told us that budgetary constraints were now likely to cause some slippage. This would in our view be particularly unfortunate because passengers find shortcomings here extremely irritating. The third goal is also likely to suffer as a result of the recent action to cut costs: LUL said that a number of things which contribute to cleanliness, appearance and customer friendliness had been deferred. Present indications are that the fourth goal will not be achieved within the targeted time-scale.

In the terms of reference, we are asked first of all whether in supplying its services LUL could improve its efficiency and thereby, without affecting targeted improvements in levels of safety or in the quality of the service provided, reduce its costs. We have taken account of two general considerations and four particular factors in assessing LUL's performance.

The first of the general considerations is that we have in our discussions with LRT and LUL discerned a conflict between LUL's commercial objective of generating enough cash to cover both operating costs and the funding of renewals and replacements, and LRT's and hence LUL's legal obligation to have due regard to London's public transport needs. This has to be seen against the background of a market where substantial real price increases are judged to be politically unacceptable. The second consideration is that LUL has to operate within a financial framework which does not facilitate the development of a consistent long-term policy in respect of the setting of fares and the planning and funding of investment. One aspect of this is the provision of ring-fenced funding to finance new lines while LUL's fundamental requirement to maintain and upgrade the existing network is to a great extent starved of the necessary funds.

The four particular factors are:

(a) the weight of safety considerations after the King's Cross fire in November 1987;

(b) the present state of the Underground;

(c) the steep increase in passenger miles over recent years; and

(d) changes in LUL's senior management and in its management structure.

The issue of safety on the Underground has occupied a great deal of senior management time since the King's Cross fire and required the implementation of major programmes of safety works. Without implying any criticism of LUL's making safety its first priority, the intensive efforts to improve levels of safety must necessarily have reduced the time available for other matters, including the pursuit of improvements in operating efficiency.

The Underground is an old system which, as we have already indicated, has over many years not been renewed at a rate necessary to sustain an efficient rapid transit railway. The most heavily used parts are generally at deep level in narrow diameter tunnels served by trains which are amongst the smallest in the world. Here, significant constraints on improving performance or increasing capacity are the tunnel size, tight curvatures, the great difficulties in the way of increasing platform lengths, and the difficult geography of existing stations including an insufficient provision of lifts and escalators to cope with present traffic volumes.

These inadequacies have been exacerbated by an increase of around 50 per cent in passenger demand over the last decade which has overstretched the system and frequently increased congestion to levels requiring the temporary closure of stations.

There have been significant changes in LUL's senior management in recent years. The Chairman was appointed in March 1989, the Managing Director in August 1988, the Engineering Director in January 1989 and the Finance Director as recently as February 1991. LUL has over this period been seeking to change its culture from a largely reactive style to one of proactive planning and management. In November 1988 it decided to establish ten line businesses with all other activities becoming supportive to those businesses. Good progress has been made but as implementation is not complete, it is too early to reach any conclusion on whether the new structure will deliver improvements in efficiency. At this interim stage, management recognises that LUL is doing unnecessary business with itself in the form of internal contracts, resulting in duplication of effort and of staff.

After taking these reservations into account, we have concluded that LUL could improve its efficiency and reduce its costs without the effects on safety and quality of service mentioned in paragraph 1.5. There are particular weaknesses in cash control both in securing fares income and in control of spending, and in management information systems generally. Despite the devolution of certain responsibilities to line businesses the staff of LUL's central directorates has shown a threefold increase since 1986. There are sound reasons for much of this increase but LUL recognises that there is some duplication of effort (see paragraph 1.19). It also said that in the post-King's Cross fire atmosphere of crisis, staff were thrown at the problem of safety in excessive numbers, and it intended that the number of staff should be sensibly managed down. In this connection we strongly support LUL's more recent work on risk assessment aimed at making the best use of available funds. LUL has told us that labour practices which restrict productivity (some unofficial and some embodied in agreements-see paragraph 1.34) still exist and that it intends to deal with them in the course of its current value analysis programme. It conceded that there was substantial scope for improvements in the efficiency of rolling stock maintenance but said that it was partly dependent on modernising its depots.

We have also been asked whether the quality of service provided could be improved without any increase in costs: it follows from paragraph 1.12 that it could, but this does not imply that the resulting level of service would be satisfactory.

The last broad question in the terms of reference is the extent to which a higher quality of service might generate higher net revenue. The short answer is that real fares increases justified by improved quality of service would increase net revenue. However, leaving aside the matter of whether LUL would be allowed to introduce significant real fares increases (see paragraph 1.21), it would not be possible for LUL's present ticketing system to reflect quality improvements in different parts of the network in the fares for the particular services concerned.

Investment in the Underground

The need for investment in the Underground at a much higher level than in the past has been recognised on all sides. In order to provide an acceptably modern network, LUL sees the need for an average expenditure of £700 million to £750 million a year over the remainder of the decade, excluding the cost of new lines and extensions to existing lines. By comparison, investment over the last five years averaged £290 million a year at 1990/91 prices. On the basis of current provisional funding guidelines, LUL plans to invest £384 million, also at 1990/91 prices, in 1991/92. Given the fierce competition for scarce Government funds, it is unlikely that the Government will meet the whole investment need foreseen by LUL. Equally it is unrealistic to expect increased efficiency on the part of LUL, imperative though this is, to bridge the gap. In our view there will have to be an enhanced contribution from real increases in fares.

The balance between Government finance and real fares increases is a matter for the Government to determine in consultation with LRT. We would merely observe that Government policy in this matter needs to be clear and to recognise, as far as it is feasible to do so, the long planning horizon, ten years or more, necessary for the efficient management of a modern railway. LUL must play its part. Its recent investment plans have been unrealistic and resulted in considerable problems when these plans failed to match the funding available and had to be scaled down. LUL must plan on the basis of the resources likely to be available.

As regards the contribution from increasing efficiency, we have noted LUL's productivity target of 2 per cent each year on average over five years and have recommended that it should be seen as a minimum target to be achieved. The unions have indicated to us their willingness to cooperate in measures to improve productivity but, above all, it will require firmer and more systematic direction by senior management than has been evident in the recent past. It seems to us that financial constraints have provided the spur for the currently proposed reductions in costs rather than a sustained drive for improved efficiency. Both the taxpayer and the fare-paying passenger are entitled to value for money. LUL needs to demonstrate on a continuing basis that it is making the best use of existing resources in an efficient and businesslike way.

We now turn to the special questions in the terms of reference:

(a) the scope for improvements in efficiency and manpower productivity and the appropriateness of the management structure;

Taking management structure first, we found that it was designed to facilitate a more commercial approach, to reduce the number of management tiers and to meet criticisms in the aftermath of the King's Cross fire that the Underground was under-managed. We also found that the resulting spans of control, at near double the accepted practice, were too wide for effective control; that the introduction of the client and internal contractor concept had resulted in fragmentation of responsibility and duplication of effort; and that the present level of devolution to line businesses needed to be developed further, as LUL planned to do. We have recommended that LUL should review its Headquarters structure with the aim of reducing spans of control below double figures and that it should take steps to clarify responsibility and eliminate duplication by October 1991.

We have already indicated in general terms the scope for LUL to improve its efficiency and manpower productivity (see paragraph 1.12). We review particular matters in more detail under subsequent headings.

(b) the method of determining the level and structure of fares and the relationship of fares both to cost structures and to the level of peak and off-peak demand on the network;

LRT, and hence LUL, have not been able to raise fares in real terms by as much as they wished because of Government concern over the fares increases proposed, although in principle the Government supports an element of real pricing in LUL's pricing policy. At the same time LUL's ability to change its fares structure has been constrained by requests from the Government not to raise individual fares by significantly more than the average fares increase. We believe this has damaged LUL's ability to achieve both the objectives of its fares policy and to plan ahead, and we have made a number of recommendations aimed at improving matters.

Many of the costs of providing LUL's services are not specific to the operation of individual services at particular times of day and this raises formidable allocation problems. Nevertheless, in our view, the allocation of costs on a regular basis to specific lines, and where appropriate sections of lines, at different times of the day would help LUL to set fares which more truly reflect costs and help to identify those services which are not covering their marginal costs of operation. LUL needs to develop a clear pricing policy and to produce the cost data necessary for its successful implementation. We have recommended accordingly.

(c) the management of LUL's investment programme and the appraisal and management of individual capital projects;

LUL has acknowledged that its past record of project management has been unsatisfactory but over the past two years it has, we believe, taken steps to assess the resources required for managing the increased level of project activity arising from the significantly enlarged investment programme. We have made a number of recommendations further to improve matters particularly by establishing procedures for monitoring overruns or overspends and making better use of LUL's computerised project management system.

The planning process within the Underground Investment Programme (UIP) has in the past been based on unrealistic assumptions about future levels of funding which cause problems in arriving at well-considered investment plans. We are concerned that LUL has not always considered enough options in looking at investment. Increased effort here would help it to respond with greater flexibility to funding constraints. More fundamentally, we have recommended that the UIP for future years should be based on the three scenarios approach recently proposed by LUL-Treasury guidelines, essential and desirable levels of expenditure; and should spell out the implications of different levels of funding, including the interrelationship between projects and the effect on the achievement of Business Goals. We have also recommended that LUL should, within the next UIP, make more systematic use of information on cost benefit ratios and the financial impact of projects in arriving at its project priority ranking, and that it should ensure that a full risk assessment of investment in safety is in place by the end of 1991.

On the matter of investment appraisal, we have concluded that LUL should do more to present options to the LRT Board, including the different funding implications, and more to assess the effect of delaying projects on its costs. We have recommended accordingly and made a number of other recommendations concerning particularly the basis for assessing projects, the need to carry out systematic sensitivity analysis and to base maintenance and renewal of such key assets as the permanent way, rolling stock and signalling on an optimal replacement policy which takes account of costs, revenue and passenger benefits.

(d) the efficiency of LUL in adjusting services to match demand and whether greater efficiency would increase net revenue;

We have been impressed by the technical modelling capability of LUL in its planning to match services to demand. It has not, however, been able to deliver its planned service. We are also concerned that it has tended to concentrate on peak services and has not given enough attention to off-peak services.

LUL's recent review of service levels showed that there are areas where operating costs can be reduced. We are concerned that these savings only appear to have been identified and brought forward as a result of a cash crisis, though LUL told us that these potential cost savings would have been identified and introduced in due course. This suggests to us that LUL does not routinely scrutinise its services as rigorously as it should. We have recommended an annual review of all investment and operating expenditure affecting capacity in order to ensure that the balance between expenditure in different areas is appropriate.

In the central area during peak periods LUL provides as many trains as practicable within the current operating constraints, which as we indicate in section (e) may be only marginally alleviated by improvements in efficiency. There is otherwise no scope for increasing supply by means other than investment to increase capacity. At other times, and outside the central area, there may well be further scope for modifying services to match demand more closely but the absence of the necessary cost information makes evaluation difficult. We have found that there is a particular need to determine the costs and benefits involved with services at the margins of the operating day and at weekends. We have recommended that such analyses should be conducted every two years and that the first should be completed within one year.

We have made a number of other recommendations in the areas of passenger benefits and operating decisions, the effect of the one-day Travelcard on the evening peak and forecasts of demand, all aimed at improving LUL's efficiency in adjusting services to match demand and thereby increasing net revenue.

(e) the extent to which any deficiency in the quality of service is the result of inefficiency and in particular whether there is scope for improving the quality of LUL's service by making more effective and efficient use of existing resources;

LUL has been slow in developing the information and methods it needs to determine optimal maintenance and renewal policies, but it is now working to put this right. This is important because improvements here will enable LUL to make better use of its resources and so improve its services.

Cancellations and failure to achieve regular service intervals exacerbate overcrowding on the Underground. We have found that there is scope for reducing cancellations across the network through more vigorous and well-directed management action. We have recommended that action taken by Northern Line management to reduce cancellations should be applied to other lines, where appropriate, by October 1991. We have also made a number of specific recommendations which seek to achieve a reduction in rolling stock failure rates. Disruptions to the regular running of services arise for a number of reasons, some of which are not within LUL's control, for example smoke or fire alarms and security alerts. Within LUL's control are delays and disruptions arising from equipment failures or human error. We have concluded that LUL's failure to achieve regular service intervals has resulted, in part, from insufficient management attention to these matters within its control. We have made recommendations aimed at improving LUL's performance in this area, including the speed of restoration of services after disruption.

The measures we have suggested will be useful but they do not address the capacity constraints on the network. We would expect them to effect only a marginal improvement in overcrowding.

(f) the scope for improving operational capacity, reducing overheads and, with due attention to safety, securing reductions in operating, maintenance, repair and renewal costs particularly by improving working practices, optimum timing of work and contracting out appropriate work;

We have said in sections (d) and (e) that LUL provides as many trains as practicable during peak periods in the critical central area and that only marginal improvements are currently feasible. There is, however, substantial scope for reducing overheads and, without affecting safety, securing reductions in operating and maintenance costs, as we have indicated in paragraph 1.12.

LUL has told us that customs and practices which constrain productivity are prevalent in certain areas and in some instances are condoned by local managers. Furthermore, negotiated collective agreements contain terms which, in themselves, may inhibit improvements in productivity. Planned preventative maintenance work on rolling stock is out of phase with the availability of that stock. Planned maintenance intervals do not reflect real need and could lead to over-frequent maintenance and excess costs; nor are they effectively linked to managing or containing failures. Maintenance turnround times are excessive and may lead to higher costs. Performance in the incorporation of approved modifications, particularly those related to safety, has been unsatisfactory. We have made recommendations in all these areas.

As to contracting out, we have noted that the bulk of maintenance and renewals work is carried out in-house. The trade unions and some local managers are opposed to the principle of competitive tendering and the position is particularly delicate because of the safety implications of contracting out in a railway environment. We have recommended that LUL should pursue a policy of increasing competition in all areas where external contractors are competent to tender for work and can operate within LUL defined and controlled safety standards.

(g) the quality and effectiveness of LUL's systems of allocating costs to its business units and divisions and for monitoring and controlling these costs;

We have commended LUL's line contribution and related approaches to the identification, monitoring and control of its costs. However, LUL's intra-business charging system, which intends to ensure that costs are borne by those units which incur them, appears to be unduly complex and to involve work and negotiation disproportionate to its objective. We have recommended that LUL should review this system with a view to simplifying it.

LUL has employed and been set a target for total costs per train mile as a measure of its efficiency. We have recommended that this measure should be supplemented by a variety of measures related to other important operational characteristics such as numbers of employees and/or value of assets employed, and that LUL should also make use of measures of profitability related to passenger journeys and passenger miles.

(h) whether LUL makes full commercial use of assets, including the use and redevelopment of properties in its operational use, and in the provision of ancillary services and concessions.

LUL and London Transport Property (LTP) have wholeheartedly adopted the principal recommendations of the MMC's 1985 report on the efficiency and costs of the British Railways Board in its property activities. Their procedures are commendable and senior staff have adopted a proactive approach to property development and estate management. However, we have concluded that two effects of the financial regime within which LUL operates have been to discourage an optimal disposal strategy for LUL's assets and to cause or contribute to the postponement of a number of highly profitable commercial projects capable of significantly enhancing LUL's secondary income in respect of additional commercial units, state-of-the-art vending machines and platform telephones following proposals in LUL's Retail Business Plan.

As far as advertising on the Underground is concerned, we have concluded that London Transport Advertising (LTA) could be lighter on its feet in responding to changing market conditions and so optimising its realised prices. We have also found that LTA's method of apportioning costs appears to be inadequate, in particular, for revealing the extent of any cross-subsidisation between LUL, London Buses Ltd (LBL) and Docklands Light Railway Ltd (DLR) and for facilitating the rationalisation of the historically large number of advertising sites on the Underground through the identification of those from which the revenues obtained are insufficient to cover costs.

We have made a number of recommendations (some addressed to the Department of Transport (DTp)) aimed at improving matters in these areas.

Certain other matters arising from our inquiry are, in our view, particularly important:

Financial framework

Operating within the external financing limit (EFL) system in an uncertain environment requires strong competent management. Whatever the reasons for changes in income or expenditure, it is important for there to be proper control over cash flow and commitments, so that swift management action can be taken. LUL's financial control proved to be inadequate in 1990/91. Its other arrangements associated with such matters as project control (especially in relation to cash as against value of work done) were similarly inadequate to enable prompt and suitable remedial action. We have made a number of recommendations aimed at improving LUL's control over cash flow and commitments which we trust will reinforce its own endeavours in this direction. We have in particular recommended that responsibility for the monitoring of cash overspends and bringing these to the notice of the individuals responsible and for the management and control against the capital grant should be firmly placed on the company's Finance Director, who should nominate one specific individual to monitor and control all the elements comprising the EFL. We are glad to note that LUL has decided to cease making a slippage allowance in its project expenditure budgets. We have also recommended a rearrangement of existing EFL procedures to permit a measure of flexibility to cover expenditure phasing variations.

We have made a number of other recommendations aimed at improving the presentation of LUL's results, including additional measures of efficiency.

Management information systems

There is widespread dissatisfaction within LUL about the quality of its management information and internal management reports. We have concluded that both the number and volume of reports are excessive and that they are insufficiently focused on the key areas of management performance. Moreover they are insufficiently directed towards the provision of financial information and, in particular, financial measures and efficiency ratios. We have recommended an urgent review of these reports and that it should specifically take account of the latter need. We have also concluded that on-line information should be more widely available and should be made more comprehensive in its coverage and we have recommended accordingly.

Formal planning

The various external strategic planning exercises which influence a major part of LUL's strategy have a wide range of social benefit objectives. The internal objectives set for LUL are based on financial and quality of service targets. Nevertheless, LUL is required to carry out its investment appraisals using cost benefit analysis criteria including passenger benefits and external benefits. We have concluded that LUL is faced with conflicting objectives to an unusual degree and have recommended that LUL should put forward proposals to establish a clear framework of objectives for agreement by DTp by the end of 1991.

The business plans prepared by the lines for 1990/91 show a wide variation in both style and content. This may indicate a lack of clarity about their purpose. We have concluded that there is a need for a more standardised structure for line business plans and have recommended that LUL should take steps to identify the best practice in the existing line business plans and to incorporate this within the central guidelines for future plans.

Priorities for action

In the conclusions to the individual chapters of our report we make a number of recommendations which are summarised in Chapter 15. There are six matters which we believe should collectively have priority:

(a) control of cash against the EFL;

(b) management information systems;

(c) utilisation of manpower;

(d) fares policy and levels;

(e) management of investment programme and projects; and

(f) renewal and maintenance of the network.

The recommendations which require particular attention in those areas have been set out in bold type in Chapter 15.

Conclusion

Our inquiry has naturally concentrated on areas where LUL's performance could be improved but in our overall assessment of the public interest it is right that we should also recognise achievements on the Underground in recent years. Since the King's Cross fire, comprehensive safety management systems have been established involving LRT as well as LUL. There has been a marked improvement in the efficiency with which LUL physically resources and manages its many investment projects. The Underground Ticketing System (UTS) has been successfully implemented and substantial progress made with One Person Operation (OPO) of trains by conversion of eight of LUL's ten lines. Some 60 station modernisation schemes have been completed and the network appearance improved, particularly at the heavily used central area stations. Not least the Central Line Refurbishment Project has been commenced at a total cost of some £700 million at 1990/91 prices.

As we have already made clear, the efficiency with which LUL uses its present resources still leaves much to be desired. LUL is a long way from providing an acceptably modern network. Provision of such a network is important to the future of London and indeed to the United Kingdom as a whole, and will require massive investment by LUL over a long period. However, past failures to renew the system cannot be laid at the door of the present leadership of LUL.

The present management will be judged, at least in part, by its ability to persuade the Government to commit a stable investment programme for major improvements and extensions to the system, and to recognise the importance of real fares increases in matching revenues to costs. Recent history suggests inadequate performance by LRT and LUL in getting their case across to DTp and/or by the Department in getting the case across to HM Treasury (HMT). The travelling public has been the principal victim of under-funding and will no doubt be so for a number of years to come.

LUL has so far failed to grapple adequately with the problems associated with cash control, particularly in regard to investment projects. This is a major task and requires a substantial change in approach if the EFL difficulties which arose in 1990/91 are not to be repeated in 1991/92 and subsequently. We are also particularly concerned that there are serious shortcomings in LUL's management information systems; that LUL lacks a clear pricing policy and the data necessary for its successful implementation; that LUL has not yet got to grips either with customs and practices which it says constrain productivity in certain areas, or with negotiated collective agreements containing terms which, in themselves, may inhibit improvements in productivity; that LUL's investment programme has been based on unrealistic assumptions about future levels of funding; and that the renewal and maintenance of the network has been neglected. All these matters point to a lack of rigorous management of LUL's activities over a long period.

We have to say whether in relation to any matter falling within the questions set out in the terms of reference LUL is pursuing a course of conduct which operates against the public interest. We have noted in paragraph 1.48 substantial achievements by LUL. We have also made it abundantly clear that there are serious failings. In some cases LUL commenced appropriate action to put matters right in the course of our inquiry but, for example, it is too early to say whether improvements introduced in the critical area of control of expenditure, and in particular in the control of cash outgoings, will be successful. Some deficiencies, particularly in regard to the renewal of the network, will, after many years of neglect, require substantial assistance from the Government if they are to be put right. There is room for differences of opinion as to whether LUL itself has taken adequate steps to remedy existing failings. Bearing in mind that there is a relatively new senior management team which needs a reasonable period of time fully to prove itself, and the severe financial constraints under which it operates, we feel that LUL deserves the benefit of any doubt about the consequences of its present conduct. We therefore refrain from concluding that, at this time, LUL is pursuing a course of conduct which operates against the public interest, although if adequate remedies are not found for the deficiencies we have identified, the result in terms of the level of service provided by LUL may indeed be contrary to the public interest.

It is clear from the range of our recommendations that many things necessary for improvement in LUL's performance are not yet in place. LUL cannot be expected to take instant action in all areas. With this in mind we have in paragraph 1.47 listed the areas which we believe should have priority, and in these and in some other areas we have, where appropriate, agreed with LUL specific target dates for implementation of our recommendations. These targets must be met.

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