Fine fragrances: A report on the supply in the UK
for retail sale of fine fragrances
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Summary
On 19 November 1992 the Director General of Fair Trading (DGFT) asked
us to investigate the supply in the UK for retail sale of fine fragrances
(see Appendix 1.1).
Fine fragrances are defined in our terms of reference to mean perfumes,
eaux de parfum, eaux de toilette, eaux de cologne and aftershave lotions
which are supplied to retailers at a resale price exceeding £15
per 50ml. The fragrance houses supply these products only to retail outlets
which, in principle, provide an ambience which accords with the luxury
image of the products. This is a form of selective distribution.
Some aspects of the selective distribution systems operated by the fragrance
houses are caught by Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome which, in summary,
prohibits agreements which prevent, restrict or distort competition. The
EC Commission has recently granted exemptions under Article 85(3) to the
standard retailer agreements of two fragrance houses. In doing so it effectively
laid down the conditions for the operation of selective distribution in
the supply of fine fragrances. A key point is that any retailer meeting
the qualitative criteria laid down by a given supplier must, on application,
be accepted as an authorized stockist. In our inquiry we have examined
the effects of the selective distribution systems on the UK public interest.
We estimate that total sales of fine fragrances in the UK in 1992 were
some £230 million at wholesale prices. Two-thirds of the total
consisted of sales by fragrance houses to their authorized domestic retailers,
over a fifth were sales by fragrance houses to duty-free retailers and
the rest were grey-market supplies, ie products which had been sold outside
the authorized network. The supply is relatively unconcentrated: the largest
supplier, the L'Oréal group, has about [*
] per cent of the total and the top five have some 60 per cent between
them. The main types of retailer are department stores and chemists, the
three largest being Boots The Chemists Ltd (Boots), Debenhams PLC (Debenhams)
and House of Fraser (Stores) Limited (HoF).
There is no scale monopoly but we found that a complex monopoly situation
existed in that all the leading fragrance houses refuse to supply retailers
whom they have not authorized. All but one of them also recommend resale
prices, which most leading authorized retailers observe for most of the
time.
Fine fragrances are marketed as luxury products and we accept that the
suppliers need to be able to control their distribution in order to protect
the brand images which consumers evidently value. There is no shortage
of other fragrances at much lower prices. We found that the UK had until
recently been a relatively high-price market. This situation has changed
as a result of increased competition among suppliers, the fall in demand
during the recession, the entry of prominent retailers selling grey-market
supplies at a discount and the development of the single EC market. Wholesale
prices have fallen slightly in real terms since 1990 and suppliers' profitability
is variable. We noted, however, that wholesale prices to duty-free retailers
are well below the level of prices to domestic retailers, and we believe
that the duty-free regime generally distorts the market. Although authorized
retailers place the emphasis on non-price competition, there is currently
an increasing amount of price competition as well. The market is competitive
and we concluded that the selective distribution systems as a whole were
not operating against the public interest.
We looked closely at the fragrance houses' arrangements for assessing
retailers' applications for authorized status, giving particular attention
to complaints which we received from Superdrug Stores PLC (Superdrug)
and Tesco Stores Ltd (Tesco) that suppliers were exercising unfair discrimination
in refusing to supply them. Although we found some anomalies, we were
not persuaded that the fragrance houses were failing to implement in good
faith the new arrangements approved by the EC Commission. We found no
clear evidence that suppliers were using their selective distribution
systems as an indirect means of seeking to maintain resale prices.
The EC Commission exemptions permit a supplier to require authorized
retailers to stock at least two-thirds of the products in each brand range
which they sell, and to purchase at least 40 per cent of the average level
of purchases from that fragrance house achieved by all authorized outlets
in the same member state in the previous year. A supplier may also require
an authorized retailer to stock a number of competing brands. There is
some evidence that these requirements may deter some retailers from applying
for authorized status.
We have reached no adverse finding as regards the public interest. The
present time is a period of transition as the fragrance houses implement
the revised arrangements approved by the EC Commission. The exemptions
apply until 1997 and we consider that their effects on competition should
be thoroughly reviewed at that time. Meanwhile we suggest that the Office
of Fair Trading (OFT) should monitor complaints from retailers and the
effect of the range-stocking and minimum purchase requirements. We also
suggest that the fragrance houses should set up a straight forward scheme
of independent arbitration for cases where a retailer considers that any
issue relating to the grant or withdrawal of authorized status has not
been handled in accordance with the procedures approved by the EC Commission.
Full text
Contents
|
Chapters
|
|
| Chapter
1 |
Summary |
| Chapter
2 |
Background |
| Chapter
3 |
Fine fragrances in the UK |
| Chapter
4 |
Formal relationships between suppliers and retailers
in the UK |
| Chapter
5 |
Financial aspects |
| Chapter
6 |
Views of retailers and other interested parties |
| Chapter
7 |
Views of suppliers |
| Chapter
8 |
Conclusions |
| |
List of signatories |
| Glossary |
|
Appendices
|
|
| (The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
The reference and conduct of the inquiry |
| 2.1 |
The EC Commission Decision on Yves Saint Laurent Parfums |
| 3.1 |
Product characteristics in the different categories
of fragrances: fine, volume prestige and mass-market fragrances |
| 3.2 |
Suppliers' comments on the marketing and distribution
of fine fragrances and on the effects of selective distribution |
| 3.3 |
Suppliers' views on the recommended resale prices |
| 4.1 |
Summary of provisions contained in retailer agreements |
| 4.2 |
Application of criteria in assessing retailer requests
for authorized status |
| 4.3 |
Survey of fine fragrance retailers by Verdict Research
Limited |
| 4.4 |
Survey of pharmacies and drugstores by Research International
Limited |
| 5.1 |
Cost and price profiles |
| 5.2 |
Profitability of the eight listed distributors |
| 5.3 |
Pro forma of the profitability statements that the eight
listed distributors were asked to provide |
| 5.4 |
Costs, retail selling prices and gross margins of retailers'
best-selling SKUs |
| 5.5 |
Contributions and assistance by fragrance houses to
retailers selling fine fragrances |
| 8.1 |
MMC's provisional findings |
| 8.2 |
Remedies for aggrieved retailers |
| 8.3 |
Example of arbitration scheme for disputes with company-owned
filling station licensees |
| Index |
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