British Waterways Board: A report on the service provided
by the Board
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Summary
We have been asked to investigate a number of questions relating to the
efficiency and costs of and the services provided by the British Waterways
Board (BWB) in carrying out its functions and the extent to which it meets
its objectives agreed with the Department of the Environment (DoE) on
26 July 1984 (see Appendix 1.1).
In this chapter we discuss the main issues arising from our investigation.
A summary of our recommendations, including wherever possible specific
target dates for implementation agreed with BWB, appears at the end of
the report in Chapter 15. We draw attention to key recommendations in
that chapter in bold type.
This is our second report on BWB. In Chapter 14 we set out in summary
form the recommendations made in our first report and what BWB told us
about the actions it has taken (or has refrained from taking) on each
recommendation. To these we have added our own comments made in the light
of our recent investigations.
Background
BWB was established as a separate nationalized freight transport industry
by the Transport Act 1962. It has responsibility for certain inland waterways,
together with associated harbours, docks, vessels, warehouses and estates.
Under the Transport Act 1968, BWB's waterways were divided into three
categories: commercial, cruising and remainder. BWB has to maintain the
commercial and cruising waterways and keep them fit for navigation for
vessels of the size normally using them in 1967. It is required to deal
with remainder waterways in the most economical way consistent with public
health, amenity and safety.
The network of canals and other waterways for which BWB is responsible
totals some 2,000 miles. Cruising waterways (those used primarily for
leisure traffic) account for about 58 per cent of the total, commercial
waterways for around 19 per cent and remainder waterways for the balance
of 23 per cent. This reflects the profound change over the years in use
of the network, which has largely lost its original function of carrying
freight. Some waterways are owned by other bodies, such as local authorities
and canal trusts. The map at Appendix 1.2 shows the complete waterways
network in Great Britain, and identifies those for which BWB is responsible.
BWB has some profitable activities (in the sense of covering direct
costs and making a contribution to overheads) such as boat licensing,
the provision of moorings, supplying water, letting properties and developing
sites, but the network as a whole is not commercially viable. Its need
for support (a grant in 1992/93 of some £51 million from Government
and a further £6 million from other sources, mainly local authorities)
arises from the high cost of meeting its extensive public service obligations.
It has to maintain a 200-year-old canal system in a safe condition. This
outstanding heritage from the first industrial revolution has many fine
listed structures which are expensive to keep in good repair. Indeed the
whole canal network is part of the nation's heritage and many canals are
themselves listed. BWB also has extensive environmental responsibilities,
including over 60 sites of special scientific interest (SSSI) and hundreds
of conservation areas and areas of special landscape character. Countless
walkers and picnickers enjoy the waterways, and there is no practicable
way of imposing charges on them even if it was thought desirable to do
so. Similarly, BWB's important contribution to land drainage is made largely
free of charge.
Performance
We are first asked in the terms of reference whether, in carrying out
its functions and in meeting the objectives agreed with the DoE, BWB could
improve its efficiency and thereby reduce its costs without affecting
the quality of the service it provides.
In reviewing BWB's performance, we have been struck by the transformation
since our last report. It has changed from a centralized organization
orientated towards administering a grant to one developing a strong commercial
outlook, whilst still meeting its statutory obligations, and enjoying
the new philosophy of devolution to the regions and, within the regions,
to individual waterways. In the process the number of staff has been reduced
by about a third between 1981/82 and 1992/93, while the general quality
of staff has been improved by a strong emphasis on training and, where
necessary, by recruitment from outside. This has been accompanied by an
increased level of contracting out.
BWB believes that much of its improved performance arises from its Integrated
Business Strategy (IBS), which was formally approved by the DoE and the
Treasury in spring 1989. The IBS aims to enable BWB fully to exploit its
non-operational property to give future revenue streams, to reduce operating
costs and to improve waterway standards. BWB has calculated that on a
net present value (NPV) basis the IBS is clearly preferable in the medium
and long term to the alternative of selling off all the non-operational
property. BWB has conceded that the IBS is not strictly a strategy (see
paragraph 1.27) but has attributed more of its improved performance to
the IBS than we would. However, we still prefer the IBS to the property
disposal option because we believe that BWB's exploitation of those of
its properties which have development potential is integral to the future
of the waterways.
The IBS is entirely compatible with the statement of objectives BWB
agreed with the DoE in 1984 (see Appendix 2.2), in particular, that the
greater part of the canal network should be managed imaginatively for
the purposes of leisure, recreation, amenity and conservation; that public
use and enjoyment of the waterways should be enhanced; and that opportunities
to expand and develop profitable activities should be pursued, in conjunction
with the private sector, where possible.
We have been left with the impression of undue concern within BWB about
preparing the organization for privatization. There is a danger that such
concern might distract staff from their primary task of improving BWB's
performance under present arrangements. We applaud the desire within BWB
`to operate with the same kind of energy as a private company'. However,
BWB's recent performance suggests that this is reconcilable with present
arrangements. We are sure that the Government's recent statement that
there is no intention to privatize BWB `in this Parliament or any subsequent
Parliament' will encourage all at BWB to concentrate on that primary task.
We were concerned to note the feeling amongst some of BWB's customers
that their complaints had been dealt with neither expeditiously nor with
sufficient understanding of their problems. We therefore welcome both
BWB's recent publication of a Customer Charter and its appointment of
a waterways Ombudsman.
It seems to us that over the next few years BWB faces a dual challenge:
(a) to maintain the momentum of improvement in its performance by sustaining
and developing its more recently found commercial ethos; and
(b) at the same time to achieve and show that it is achieving the right
balance between its commercial drive and its responsibilities which range
far more widely then those of an ordinary commercial organization. This
is particularly true in the area of conservation.
As we indicate below, we have made a number of recommendations aimed
at reinforcing BWB's own drive to improve its performance. We believe
that BWB could improve its efficiency and reduce its costs without affecting
the quality of the services it provides, and that the quality of BWB's
services could be improved without any increase in costs.
The further broad question in the terms of reference is whether an improvement
in the quality of BWB's services might generate higher net revenue. This
is a difficult question to answer in the absence of:
(a) a systematic study of the elasticities of demand of the kind we
recommend (see paragraph 1.23); and
(b) a costing system capable of routinely providing information on the
costs of enhancing the level of a particular service (see paragraph 1.39).
We have concluded, however, that there is considerable scope for BWB
to expand its share of the leisure markets. If this is coupled with an
adequate knowledge of elasticities of demand and an improved costing system,
we expect BWB to be able to reflect improvements in the quality of its
leisure services in its charges.
Particular questions
We now turn to the particular questions in the terms of reference.
(a) The extent to which BWB has implemented the recommendations of our
1987 report
As we show in Chapter 14, BWB has made good progress in implementing
our 1987 report. It has for the most part addressed the recommendations
positively and constructively. The development of business planning, the
introduction of waterway standards, the revision of project control guidelines
and the introduction of new computerized accounting and reporting systems
are particularly noteworthy. It is disappointing that BWB has not made
more progress in studying systematically the relationship between price
and demand in its leisure activities, and that the Board is still entirely
composed of non-executive directors. We return to these matters at paragraphs
1.23 and 1.24. As to property development, BWB has, as we recommended,
pressed ahead strongly with developing revenue from its estate. Our worry
is that there may now be too much emphasis on the property side of the
business.
(b) The scope for contracting out the Board's operational and support
services and
(c) BWB's procedures for market testing
On the operational side, BWB has contracted out some 90 per cent of
its major works and over 40 per cent of its routine maintenance work.
There is little scope for further contracting out of major works, apart
from dredging. BWB's experience in contracting out routine maintenance
has been of variable cost-effectiveness, leading us to believe that the
scope for further contracting out of this activity is likely to be limited.
As to support services, BWB intends to market test a number of functions
including payroll administration, credit control and aspects of information
technology with a view to contracting out if appropriate. There is, however,
a misconception within BWB of the arrangements for market testing, and
as a result BWB has failed to make a full cost comparison of in-house
bids where these are still feasible against those obtained from external
sources.
We have made recommendations aimed at improving BWB's contracting-out
and market testing procedures (see paragraph 10.52).
(d) The efficiency and effectiveness of BWB's long-term preventive maintenance
and repair programme
The efficiency and effectiveness of this programme has improved very
significantly since our 1987 report. The introduction of the Waterway
Standards for navigation and environment and devolution to Regional and
Waterway Managers have improved long-term maintenance. It is planned that
`critical arrears' of maintenance should be eliminated by the end of 1996/97.
The normal programme of contract works should then prevent the further
build-up of such arrears. We have recommended that once the critical arrears
programme has been completed the maintenance budget should accommodate
all works required to maintain the system without incurring further critical
arrears.
We have noted the criticism of BWB's dredging programme but conclude
that, although some lengths and spot locations need urgent attention from
time to time, BWB is broadly meeting its obligations to provide adequate
navigation channels to satisfy present traffic. However, in the light
of the standards set out in the Customer Charter, published in August
1993, much remains to be done for which significant budget allocations
will need to be made in the near future. We have recommended ways in which
BWB could improve communications with users on dredging matters at national
and local levels. We have also recommended that BWB should retain a sufficient
dredging capacity to enable a fast response to emergencies such as a blocked
waterway but that all planned dredging operations in all regions should
be contracted out with effect from 1 October 1994, unless such contracts
are shown to be less cost-effective than in-house operation. BWB has succeeded
in providing dredging tips for its immediate needs but there is a potential
shortage, particularly in the light of the effects of the Environmental
Protection Act 1990 (EPA). We are concerned that BWB's restrictions on
dredging activities will before long recur, to the detriment of users.
We have recommended that BWB should approach the DoE for help in dealing
with the various authorities in order to speed up the licensing process
of its own tips and those of contractors it proposes to employ.
(e) BWB's methods for determining the level of charges to customers and
(f) the scope for increasing revenue from fees and charges and
(g) the extent to which BWB could increase net revenue through promoting
a greater range of chargeable activities
We have found that there is considerable scope for BWB to expand its
shares of the water-related leisure markets but that BWB lacks key information
about the responsiveness of demand to changes in price. We have recommended
that it should study systematically such responsiveness and estimate demand
elasticities. We have also made a number of detailed recommendations aimed
at improving its revenue from leisure activities, including the creation
of a more active and aggressive marketing strategy and the allocation
of responsibility for the development of BWB's leisure and tourism business
to a single manager within its Commercial Department. There is evidently
scope for BWB to increase net revenue from a greater range of chargeable
leisure activities.
(h) The scope for improving BWB's management structure and the use made
of its manpower
It is in principle unsatisfactory that BWB's Chief Executive and departmental
directors are not on the Board and so do not share directly in the Board's
formal and collective responsibilities. Second, we find a lack of clarity
in the Board's minutes. Third, we note that, when the present Chairman
was reappointed, his commitment was, at his request, reduced from three
to two days a week with effect from 1 April 1993, although we understand
that he continues in practice to work in excess of three days a week.
We have recommended that the Chief Executive, the Director of Finance,
the Commercial Director and the Director of Engineering should be appointed
to the Board; that the Board should ensure that approval for all significant
projects, developments or changes is sought at meetings of the Board;
and that the Board's decisions are recorded in the minutes, using clear
and consistent terminology. We have also recommended that the Chairman
should be appointed for four days a week. This recognizes BWB's diverse
objectives, widely dispersed locations, and multiplicity of users and
interest groups.
We referred in paragraph 1.8 to the success of BWB's philosophy of devolution
from the centre, and noted the significant reduction in staff numbers,
which has been combined with regrading and improved manpower flexibility.
The process of restructuring has, however, been costly and there has been
an element of wage drift. In order to address this problem, we have recommended
that BWB should now give priority to monitoring the payroll to ensure
that wage drift does not recur. We believe that an effective system of
work measurement would also assist BWB to control costs and have recommended
that a standard system across the BWB network should be in place by April
1994.
(i) The scope for involving the private sector in the management of BWB's
assets
The private sector is already involved in a large number of locations
either as lessees or as partners in ventures involving, for example, moorings,
docks and buildings. We believe there is in addition scope for greater
use of local estate agents to assist in the disposal of BWB's numerous
low-value sites (see paragraph 1.28). Bearing in mind BWB's diverse responsibilities,
we doubt whether the private sector could be usefully involved in the
management of individual waterways. They are, in our view, better left
within BWB's successful devolved management system. More generally, we
have found that BWB has relied too heavily on consultants for management,
policy and technical advice which its own staff could be expected to provide.
We have recommended that BWB should place more reliance on its own management
and professional staff and less on consultants.
(j) BWB's procedures for assessing priorities including its corporate
planning process
We referred to the IBS in paragraph 1.9. We regard it more as a statement
of management philosophy than a strategy. It does not, for example, include
a statement of priorities and how they are to be balanced; therefore amenity,
leisure, environment and heritage ostensibly enjoy equal consideration
with commercial and cruising use and maintenance of the waterways. The
IBS was originally assessed, and has since been reassessed, against a
narrow methodology-essentially an NPV analysis-and has been evaluated
exclusively against options for property disposal. In our view, this has
led to an undue emphasis on the property aspects of the IBS and the danger
of the property tail wagging the waterways dog. A much wider range of
criteria would be appropriate and the development of alternative waterway
plans would facilitate strategic planning. We have recommended that BWB
should reconsider the criteria by which strategies are chosen, and then
agree a more explicit strategy with the DoE. The 1994/95 Corporate Plan
should set out the reconsidered criteria on which BWB should be judged
and its performance against each of them; and the 1995/96 plan should
indicate the relative importance given to each criterion. We have also
recommended that BWB should give more prominence in its corporate plans
to its arrangements for co-operation with funding bodies other than the
Government (see paragraph 1.29).
(k) The scope for improvement in estate management by BWB; in the effectiveness
of its programme of rationalization of its low-value sites; and in the
extent to which its approach maximizes the return from its sites with
potential for development
BWB has over 15,000 properties ranging from narrow strips of land alongside
its canals to substantial acreage surrounding its docks and basins in
urban areas, and from small cottages to big warehouses. Many of its sites
are of low value and yield little, but are costly to manage. We found
that this large widely dispersed estate was in general efficiently managed
on a day-to-day basis, and that it was carefully sifted for the small
proportion of properties with development potential.
Some of the most effective developments on the waterways are those either
wholly carried out by local authorities and other funding bodies or carried
out by those bodies with the involvement of BWB. We believe that the willingness
of other funding bodies to participate is a broad indication of the value
of the improvements in public amenities, a `public good' for which it
is not usually practicable for BWB to charge. While we doubt the practicability
of quantifying such benefits with any reasonable degree of accuracy, we
believe it is a truth universally acknowledged that they are substantial.
We have recommended that BWB should give at least equal funding priority
to co-operation with other funding bodies as it gives to funding of ventures
in which the private sector is involved, and also give more prominence
to such arrangements in both its corporate plans and its reports and accounts.
BWB's programme for disposal of its low-value sites has made rather
slow progress. We recognize that the market has been unfavourable and
that disposal is time-consuming but we believe that BWB should now step
up its efforts to reduce these sites to more manageable numbers. This
should allow it to concentrate on its income-generating properties. We
have recommended that within the next five years, BWB should aim to dispose
of all its low-value sites which are unable to play a significant role
in future developments, are relatively costly to manage and are not required
for access. We also recommend that BWB should use local estate agents
as necessary.
BWB has identified some 600 properties with development potential. We
carried out case studies of three of the larger developments, Stanley
Ferry, Bulls Bridge and Willow Grange, and reviewed two more, Limehouse
Basin and Leeds Canal Basin, to gain some insight into the quality of
this area of BWB's work. We found that its performance was mixed.
The Stanley Ferry project, aimed at raising the value of the site and
generating income, showed a high degree of professionalism on the part
of BWB. At the same time BWB achieved significant environmental improvement
and the restoration of a listed building. This demonstrates BWB's proper
role as a facilitator, using its skills and expertise in waterway developments
in the context of its wide-ranging public responsibilities. It should,
in our view, continue as far as possible to leave risk-taking to its commercial
partners whose proper entrepreneurial function it is.
The redevelopment of BWB's Bulls Bridge site was a complex project.
The site was worth over £[ * ] but
was occupied by four tenants of BWB, and they received substantial compensation
for surrender of their leases or in one case for surrender of a right
of way. BWB emerged with a gain of some £2 million, and control
of the residential mooring activities adjacent to the site. The back-to-back
negotiations eliminated all significant risk to BWB. In our view the outcome
reflects credit on BWB.
We found cause for concern in the project to establish BWB's headquarters
at Willow Grange. This followed the recommendation in our 1987 report
that BWB should carry out its intention to bring all its Head Office staff
together. The cost escalated from £4.7 million to £9.4 million
primarily because of the decision to exploit the site more fully by constructing
a larger building than BWB needed for its own use. This introduced a purely
speculative element into the project. There were also many delays and
by the time it was finally decided to go ahead with the project in November
1989 there were indications that the property market had turned. The Board
of BWB, although kept advised of developments at key times, had little
involvement and were never formally asked to approve the project. The
Board `noted' rather than approved the final project in the Board minutes
(on the basis that the project was for the DoE to approve). Insufficient
attention was paid to risks and costs involved in the total project, and
there was a lack of clarity and a degree of informality in decision-making
and in the Board's involvement. The leasing of temporary accommodation
at Greycaine Road, Watford, was also, in our view, less than satisfactorily
handled: the risks were underestimated; the scale of the commitment was
not fully appreciated; and financial controls on taking on property leases
proved to be inadequate. This latter point bears out our criticism of
the Board and its lack of formality at paragraph 1.24.
BWB argued that because of the savings from the substantial improvement
in organizational efficiency, the main reason for establishing its headquarters
at Willow Grange, it was fair to conclude that the project had been a
considerable success. We acknowledge the gains in efficiency but believe
that they could have been achieved more economically.
The Limehouse Basin and Leeds Canal Basin projects are joint ventures
in which BWB has a 49 per cent share (the maximum allowed under Government
guidelines). In each case it has provided substantial funds. Present figures
show a small surplus on the Leeds Canal Basin project. However, part of
the funds invested in the Limehouse Basin project now appear to be in
jeopardy. We doubt whether in making these arrangements BWB took fully
into account the risks involved if the developments did not go according
to plan. We understand that with the benefit of hindsight BWB would not
enter into further joint ventures of this kind.
Looking at the five projects covered by our case studies and reviews
as a whole, we found that BWB was an effective facilitator of all the
developments. But its taking on significant development risks in the Willow
Grange, Limehouse Basin and Leeds Canal Basin projects has so far not
maximized BWB's returns on the funds invested. It is too early to say
what returns and increases in net asset value BWB may eventually achieve
from these projects but there have been serious setbacks (see Chapter
9). In these cases BWB's appraisals showed excessive optimism in their
focus on possible large development gains. We have recommended that BWB
should avoid taking a significant share in development risk and hence
in the funding of developments, restricting its role mainly to acting
as facilitators.
(l) The scope for improving BWB's financial and management systems and
(m) BWB's operational flexibility, and ability to control costs and increase
revenues, bearing in mind the legislative framework and development control
procedures within which they operate
We have already commented favourably on BWB's introduction of a new
computerized accounting and reporting system following our 1987 report
(see paragraph 1.17). Nevertheless, two main issues arise from our study
of BWB's present financial and management systems: cost analysis and the
management information strategy.
The existing cost allocation system provides costing information on
a waterways basis. There is little or no regularly available information
which enables BWB to separate the cost of providing its public amenity
services such as drainage, public safety and heritage from the costs of
providing facilities for cruising, mooring, commercial navigation and
angling. In our view, a successful integrated strategy for BWB's business
depends on awareness of the costs and benefits of each service it provides
and the determination of priorities for expenditure. This requires a different
system of accounting for costs and we have recommended one which identifies
the costs of providing the basic public amenity services and separates
the costs associated with the provision of special user facilities. This
would have the objective of facilitating BWB's progress towards identifying
the value of those of its activities for which there is no specific income
stream.
Parts of BWB's information technology systems are not yet meeting users'
needs. Bearing in mind that BWB's current review of these systems has
so far made little progress, we have recommended that it should undertake
a full review of its management information strategy and present systems
to ensure that they meet users' needs at least cost.
Two matters presently outside BWB's control affect its operational flexibility.
First we found that developments close to waterways can increase significantly
its liability for water containment and safety. We have accordingly recommended
that BWB should be a statutory consultee in local authority planning applications
for sites which are sufficiently near to BWB's waterways to require specific
works to guarantee the safety of the site and waterway concerned. Secondly,
the present lack of automatic powers of access through riparian owners'
lands adjoining its waterways for the purpose of carrying out emergency
or maintenance works causes difficulties and increases costs. BWB is seeking
such powers in its Bill at present at the Committee stage in the House
of Commons.
(n) The scope for improving the cost-effectiveness of BWB's expenditures
on conservation of the heritage and the environment
As the specific costs of maintaining the heritage and environmental
aspects of BWB's waterways and associated structures are not accounted
for separately, the cost-effectiveness of such work cannot be properly
assessed or controlled. We have recommended that:
(a) heritage and environmental costs should where possible be separately
analysed; and
(b) the various heritage and environmental responsibilities should be
brought together in a single unit reporting to the Director of Engineering,
who should be responsible for ensuring that its remit runs throughout
the network.
Conclusion
We have identified (see paragraph 1.2) the following priority areas
for improvement in BWB's performance:
(a) corporate planning;
(b) identification of costs;
(c) co-operation with funding bodies other than the Government;
(d) the composition of the Board and the recording of its decisions;
(e) the control of costs of human resources;
(f) BWB's role in local authority planning applications;
(g) authorization of financial commitments;
(h) contracting out; and
(i) water-related leisure markets.
As indicated in paragraph 1.2, the recommendations which require particular
attention in those areas have been set out in bold type in Chapter 15.
BWB itself knows that it has some way to go to implement fully its commercial
ethos and its Board wishes to maintain the momentum imparted by its present
Chairman. We have been concerned to assist in this endeavour and in our
assessment we have given due weight to BWB's substantial achievements
since our 1987 report, which we outlined in paragraph 1.8. We welcome
the considerable progress it has made in changing the culture of the organization
and sensitively managing a sharp reduction in staff numbers. We saw enthusiasm
and dedication at all levels of BWB.
We are required to consider whether, in relation to any matter falling
within our terms of reference, BWB is pursuing a course of conduct which
operates against the public interest. We find that it is not doing so.
Heritage and Environment have become two of the most overloaded words
in the English language and they are not easy to define. However, money
spent on the canal system from whatever source will, by and large, in
town centres do something to mitigate the surrounding dark satanic mills
and in the countryside will give access to green and pleasant land. This,
in the ranking of national priorities, has much to commend it and we in
turn commend British Waterways, the Board and its staff for the work they
are doing.
Full text
Contents
|
Chapters
|
|
| Chapter
1 |
Assessment |
| Chapter
2 |
Background |
| Chapter
3 |
Strategy and planning |
| Chapter
4 |
Financial framework and control |
| Chapter
5 |
Organization |
| Chapter
6 |
Human resource management |
| Chapter
7 |
Management information systems |
| Chapter
8 |
Management of the BWB estate |
| Chapter
9 |
Development projects and their management |
| Chapter
10 |
Contracting out and market testing |
| Chapter
11 |
Maintenance of the waterways |
| Chapter
12 |
Waterway use, charging and income |
| Chapter
13 |
Conservation of the heritage and environment |
| Chapter
14 |
BWB's actions on the 1987 report on the maintenance of
its waterways |
| Chapter
15 |
Summary of recommendations |
| |
List of signatories |
| Glossary |
|
Appendices
|
|
| (The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
The reference |
| 1.2 |
The waterways network |
| 2.1 |
Transport Act 1968: Schedule 12 |
| 2.2 |
BWB: statement of objectives agreed with the DoE (26
July 1984) |
| 2.3 |
Integrated Business Strategy |
| 2.4 |
Inland waterways and harbours vested in the Board |
| 2.5 |
Summary of BWB canal lengths |
| 2.6 |
Statutory duties of BWB |
| 3.1 |
Check-list of Corporate Plan features |
| 3.2 |
Performance targets |
| 4.1 |
BWB: Finance Department structure |
| 5.1 |
Devolution of functions and activities to regional management |
| 5.2 |
Interested third parties which provide evidence |
| 5.3 |
Summary of the views of interested third parties |
| 6.1 |
Examples of annual hours agreements as operated within
BWB |
| 6.2 |
Examples of BWB travel and overtime records |
| 7.1 |
Purchasing system: output reports |
| 8.1 |
BWB policy guidelines |
| 9.1 |
The Limehouse project |
| 9.2 |
Leeds Canal Basin project |
| 10.1 |
Examples of contract work, 1992/93: 1. Trent and Mersey
Canal: 2. Worcester & Birmingham Canal |
| 10.2 |
BWB's procedure for initiating major works |
| 10.3 |
Procedure for selection of contractors |
| 10.4 |
List of activities for market testing |
| 11.1 |
Navigation standards-operation and maintenance |
| 11.2 |
Typical maximum craft dimensions |
| 11.3 |
Waterway Standards-example page |
| 11.4 |
Waterway Standards |
| 11.5 |
Engineering inspection procedures: frequency of inspections |
| 11.6 |
Flow chart for reporting |
| 11.7 |
Repairs to the retaining walls of the Maida Hill Tunnel,
Regents Canal, London |
| 11.8 |
North West and Scottish Region procedure for prioritizing
workload |
| 11.9 |
BWB: waterway manitenance-responsibilities |
| 11.10 |
Direct waterway costs per kilometre, 1992/93 |
| 11.11 |
Dredging factors, Midlands and South West Region |
| 11.12 |
Estimated total dredging costs by region in 1992/93 (including
EPA) |
| 11.13 |
BWB: dredging in North East Region |
| 11.14 |
BWB: classification system for sediment |
| 11.15 |
Summary classification of sample points using BWB classification
system for sediment |
| 11.16 |
Lock gate replacement programme regional requirements
for 1992 to 1997 |
| 11.17 |
Case study: refurbishment of Anchor Lock, Gargrave, Leeds & Liverpool
Canal |
| 13.1 |
Environmental check-list for assessing business plan
proposals |
| 13.2 |
List of corridor studies |
| 13.3 |
Examples of heritage sites which are to be substantially
improved and refurbished in 1993/94 |
| Index |
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