Films: A report on the supply of films for the exhibition in cinemas in the UK
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Summary
Introduction
We have been asked to investigate the supply of films for exhibition
in cinemas in the UK. When making this reference to us the Director General
of Fair Trading indicated that his own enquiries into the industry had
been prompted by complaints from independent cinemas about difficulties
in obtaining popular films from distributors. He added that most of the
major companies were vertically integrated and followed practices which
could lead to the exclusion of independent producers, distributors and
exhibitors from the market; and that although there had been changes in
the market since the previous MMC report in 1983, he considered competition
remained restricted to such an extent that a full investigation was appropriate.
Our terms of reference are set out in Appendix 1.1. The EC Commission
is also currently considering applications for clearance under EC competition
law of certain joint ventures in the industry.
Background
The theatrical distribution market was worth £103 million in 1993.
The five leading distributors, Buena Vista, Columbia, Fox, UIP and Warner
Distributors, all of which are affiliated to Hollywood studios, accounted
for about three-quarters of receipts from film rentals in the period 1990
to 1993. Each distributor's shares fluctuate quite widely from year to
year, reflecting the success of individual films. Several independent
distributors, of which the largest are Entertainment, First Independent,
Guild and Rank Film Distributors, make up the balance of this market.
The leading distributors are mainly in business to distribute the films
of their respective Hollywood studios, though most also distribute independently
produced films to a limited extent. The independent distributors compete
to obtain independently produced films.
In the exhibition market there are likewise five leading players: two
owners of long-standing circuits, MGM Cinemas and Odeon, and three recent
US owned entrants specializing in the operation of multiplex cinemas,
Natl Amusements, UCI and Warner Theatres. These five exhibitors account
for almost four-fifths of the £289 million box office receipts in
1993, numerous independent exhibitors making up the balance. All the leading
exhibitors except Odeon have some ownership link, direct or indirect,
with a Hollywood studio, but these links are not as close as those between
the Hollywood studios and their respective distribution affiliates.
The relationship between the distributors and the exhibitors is complex
and symbiotic. Neither side currently dominates the other, though independent
exhibitors are at a bargaining disadvantage vis-à-vis the leading
distributors, as are independent distributors vis-à-vis the leading
exhibitors.
The industry has been transformed since our 1983 report and is still
undergoing change. By July 1994 71 new multiplex cinemas had been built
and others are under construction or planned. Exhibitors have also invested
heavily in refurbishing older cinemas and converting them to multiscreen
use. There has been a substantial increase in the number of cinemas which
show popular films on first release. Advertising and publicity budgets
have risen strongly. Audiences have doubled after many years of continual
decline. Cinema admission prices are not excessive. In contrast to the
resurgence which has occurred in cinema going, however, British film production
during the last ten years has languished.
A large and growing proportion of the revenues from the exploitation
of films comes from the rental and sale of video cassettes and from various
forms of television broadcasting. But while the cinema now represents
perhaps only a quarter of total revenues, it remains highly important
because the success of a film in the cinema is seen as the key to its
success in these other markets too.
The monopoly situations
We find that one scale monopoly situation and one complex monopoly situation
exist within the meaning of the Fair Trading Act 1973. The scale monopoly
situation involves MGM Cinemas, which over the period 1990 to 1993 made
just over a quarter of exhibitors' total rental payments for the licensing
of films for exhibition in UK cinemas.
The complex monopoly situation involves the five leading distributors,
the four independent distributors named in paragraph 1.2 and the five
leading exhibitors, and is based on our finding of the existence of a
number of uncompetitive practices in the industry. The more significant
of these are discussed below.
Public interest issues
The scale monopoly situation does not in itself raise concerns for the
public interest. The market share of MGM Cinemas is only just over 25
per cent, and there are other strong players in the exhibition market
whose market shares are not far below.
We find two of the practices inherent in the complex monopoly situation
to be against the public interest. The first is alignment: the practice
whereby, in the first instance, a distributor normally offers its films
to, and discusses the timing and release strategy for those films with,
its aligned circuit, ie either MGM Cinemas or Odeon. In locations where
both circuits operate directly competing cinemas, aligned distributors
normally supply films to their aligned circuit but not the other. This
practice, by reducing competition for screens among aligned distributors
and reducing pressure on the two circuits to compete for films on merit,
makes the market less responsive to consumer preferences. We condemned
it in our 1983 report, but stopped short of making a recommendation because
of the then parlous plight of the industry. The industry is now stronger
and we make recommendations intended to bring this practice to an end.
The second practice which we find to be against the public interest
concerns minimum exhibition periods. Distributors sometimes insist on
lengthy minimum exhibition periods-perhaps four weeks or longer-as a condition
of supplying exhibitors with prints of popular films. This practice creates
problems particularly for single-screen cinemas or those with few screens,
reducing their freedom to respond to consumer demand, and adds to the
difficulties faced by independent distributors in getting their films
shown. We recommend that minimum exhibition periods should be restricted
to a maximum of two weeks on first release and one week subsequently.
Relevant to the exhibitors' complaints which led up to this inquiry
is the issue of refusal to supply. The established arrangements for calculating
rentals, which command industry-wide support from both distributors and
exhibitors, have the effect of reducing distributors' receipts if a given
audience is divided between two cinemas. Distributors therefore refuse
supply in circumstances where to supply another cinema would split the
potential audience and reduce their profits. Given the extent of competition
in both the distribution and exhibition markets, we consider it reasonable
for distributors to determine supply with a view to maximizing profits
on individual films. We propose, however, the establishment of some independent
machinery to consider exhibitors' complaints.
Another issue is vertical integration, to which critics of the film
industry frequently point as distorting the market and creating barriers
to entry, particularly for British films. All the Hollywood studios rely
upon their respective affiliates to distribute their films in the UK.
Given the state of competition among the studios and in the distribution
market generally, we do not object to this practice, which is common worldwide.
Four of the seven Hollywood studios also have ownership links with UK
exhibitors. We have examined whether these links result in dealings between
distributors and exhibitors being other than at arm's length. Our analysis
shows a slight degree of preference between vertically linked parties
at the margin, but the evidence does not warrant an adverse public interest
finding. We suggest nevertheless that certain indicators should be monitored
by the Office of Fair Trading so that the matter is kept under review.
Overview
Film production is an expensive and very risky business. Profitability
depends on the success of a small number of films. The Hollywood studios
account for a high proportion of box office receipts in the UK, but there
is vigorous competition between them and no one studio dominates.
We regret that the proportion of culturally British films to be seen
in UK cinemas is low, but we do not attribute this to any conspiracy or
other improper behaviour on the part of the Hollywood studios or their
UK affiliates. The Hollywood studios are skilled in producing and promoting
films that the UK public wants to see. They have the advantage of operating
in the much bigger US market, which enables them to make films with high
production costs and hence to attract the most popular stars. In deciding
which films to release in the UK and how to promote them, the studios
benefit from the experience of prior distribution in the USA. Exhibitors
are eager to show films which have proved popular in the USA and which
are heavily promoted, and the shared language makes the UK market particularly
receptive to US films.
We do not therefore underestimate the problems which British filmmakers
face in competing against Hollywood. But UK exhibitors are interested
in showing any films which they think will have popular appeal, irrespective
of origin, and recent examples demonstrate that it is possible for British
films to compete successfully for screen space. In so far as British filmmakers
produce popular films our recommendations, if implemented, may incidentally
facilitate the showing of these in UK cinemas. But the main difficulties
faced by the British film industry are beyond the scope of this inquiry.
The transformation of the industry over the last decade has worked well
for consumers. Further changes may be expected. Today, apart from the
practices we have criticized, competition in the markets under investigation
is effective.
Full text
Contents
|
Part I
|
Summary and Conclusions
|
| Chapter
1 |
Summary |
| Chapter
2 |
Conclusions |
Part II
|
Background and evidence
|
| Chapter
3 |
Background to the inquiry |
| Chapter
4 |
The market for films in the UK |
| Chapter
5 |
Financial results |
| Chapter
6 |
Views of third parties |
| Chapter
7 |
Views of leading exhibitors |
| Chapter
8 |
View of leading distributors |
| Chapter
9 |
Views of the other distributors in the complex monopoly
group |
| |
List of signatories |
Appendices
|
|
| (The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
The reference and conduct of the inquiry |
| 2.1 |
Schedule of practices engaged in by the members of the
complex monopoly group |
| 2.2 |
Original list of persons in whose favour the complex
monopoly situation was provisionally considered to exist |
| 3.1 |
Summary of the Monopolies Commission's 1966 report on
Films |
| 3.2 |
Summary of the MMC's 1983 report on Films
|
| 3.3 |
The Films (Exclusivity Agreements) Order 1989 |
| 4.1 |
Distribution and exhibitors in the UK |
| 4.2 |
Taxation: a summary of the main issues affecting film
production in the UK |
| 4.3 |
SFD Standard Conditions for licensing the commercial
exhibition of a film or films |
| 4.4 |
Survey of operators of independent cinemas in the UK |
| 4.5 |
Cinema nuts: comparisons between different distributors |
| 4.6 |
The market in the USA |
| 4.7 |
Shares of rental payments and box office receipts |
| 4.8 |
Locations affected directly by alignment |
| 4.9 |
Effects of alignment on MGM Cinema's and Odean's smaller
cinemas |
| 4.10 |
Case studies |
| 4.11 |
Pattern of release for UIP's film Ghost |
| 4.12 |
Booking of films by distributors |
| 5.1 |
Financial performance and licensing arrangements of the
distributors |
| 5.2 |
Financial performance of the five leading exhibitors |
| 6.1 |
Independent exhibitors and distributors who gave evidence |
| Glossary |
|
| Index |
|
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