Thomas Cook Group Limited and Interpayment Services Limited:
A report on the acquisition by the Thomas Cook Group Limited
of the travellers cheque issuing business of Barclays Bank
Plc
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Summary
On 9 November 1994 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
asked the MMC to investigate and report on a merger situation
concerning the acquisition by The Thomas Cook Group Limited
(Cook) of the travellers cheque issuing business of Barclays
Bank plc (Barclays). The terms of reference are at Appendix
1.1.
Both Cook and Barclays, through its subsidiary Interpayment
Services Limited (ISL), were major issuers of travellers cheques
on a worldwide scale. Cook, which issued MasterCard-branded
cheques, had a 32 per cent share of the UK market in 1994
and ISL, which issued VISA cheques, had 17 per cent. The only
other issuers of a range of travellers cheques through third
party sales agents such as banks, building societies, travel
agents and bureaux de change were American Express Company
(Amex) with 40 per cent of UK sales and Citicorp with 1 per
cent (though it accounts for some 12 per cent of world sales).
Thus the merger brought together two of the largest issuers
to give Cook about 49 per cent of the UK market.
The issuers of travellers cheques compete for the business
of sales agents who sell them to the end customer. The merger
effectively reduced from three to two the number of significant
issuers from which sales agents in the UK could choose to
receive their supplies. The importance of this reduction in
the number of issuers depends on whether travellers cheques
are a separate market or whether, as the parties argued, they
form part of a wider market which includes all the other methods
of making payments or obtaining currency overseas (such as
cash, debit cards or eurocheques). We concluded that for the
present travellers cheques do constitute a separate market
but that this situation may be expected to change as newly-developed
electronic products with characteristics similar to those
of the travellers cheque are introduced.
For the majority of sales agents-banks and building societies-there
will in future be a choice between Cook and Amex as supplier
and we believe, on balance, that these two companies will
continue to compete vigorously for the business of banks and
building societies.
However, other considerations affect those sales agents
whose main business is as travel agents or bureaux de change.
As well as being a travellers cheque issuer, Cook has a major
chain of retail travel agents and bureaux de change. Other
travel agents and bureaux de change which sell travellers
cheques have expressed a number of concerns, among them that
Cook may not continue to offer ISL travellers cheques and
that Cook's ownership of ISL will allow Cook to acquire commercially
valuable information about their business. Prior to the merger
ISL, as a subsidiary of Barclays, was not connected with the
travel business in any other capacity and so travel agents
opting for ISL travellers cheques were not in the position
of selling a competitor's product. Now they will effectively
have no choice but to offer Amex travellers cheques if they
are unwilling to use Cook as a supplier. This provides Amex
with the possibility of imposing less favourable terms and
the increased costs may then be passed on to consumers. We
find that this is an effect of the merger which may be expected
to operate against the public interest.
We recognize that some benefits would arise from the merger,
for example a gain in UK employment as a result of functions
which ISL carried out overseas being transferred to the UK.
However, we do not consider that these benefits outweigh the
adverse effect we have identified.
We have considered what action should be taken for the purpose
of preventing or remedying the adverse effect. We recommend
that Cook should:
(a) maintain MasterCard and VISA as separately branded products
and retain ISL as the sole issuer's name on the VISA cheques;
(b) not renew its agreement with MasterCard that 60 per
cent (or any other particular proportion) of the cheques issued
will be of the MasterCard brand; and
(c) take a number of steps to ensure that sales agents who
see Cook as a competitor are protected from the possibility
of information about their customers or their business getting
into the hands of Cook's retail operation.
These remedies increase the prospects that there will be
at least two credible competitors for the business of a full
range of sales agents in the UK and therefore that consumers
will be protected from the increases in charges that could
arise from a lack of effective competition.
We do not believe divestment of ISL is the most appropriate
remedy but if our other recommendations cannot be implemented
we see no alternative to divestment as a way of remedying
the adverse effect of the merger.
Full text
Contents |
Part I |
Summary and Conclusions |
| Chapter
1 |
Summary |
| Chapter
2 |
Conclusions |
Part II |
Background and evidence |
| Chapter
3 |
Background |
| Chapter
4 |
Travellers cheques |
| Chapter
5 |
The companies concerned and their financial performance |
| Chapter
6 |
The transaction |
| Chapter
7 |
Views of main parties |
| Chapter
8 |
Views of other parties |
| |
List of signatories |
Appendices |
|
| (The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
Terms of reference and conduct of the inquiry |
| 3.1 |
Statutory Instruments |
| 4.1 |
Issuers of travellers cheques world-wide, as at end
of 1994 |
| 5.1 |
US dollar and sterling interest rates, 1978 to 1994 |
| Glossary |
|
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