Fresenius AG and Caremark Limited: A report on the
proposed merger
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Summary
This inquiry concerns the proposed acquisition of Caremark Limited (Caremark)
by Fresenius AG. Our terms of reference are set out in Appendix 1.1.
Caremark provides services to patients who suffer from serious medical
conditions but are treated for them at home. The services include the
delivery of drugs or artificial feeds and the equipment required to administer
them-often by intravenous (IV) infusion-and a range of related services
which vary according to the individual case. Caremark's draft accounts
for the year to 31 December 1997 show an operating profit of £1.2
million on sales of £29.9 million.
Fresenius AG is a large and fast-growing German healthcare company. It
is one of the world's leading suppliers of products and services for kidney
dialysis. Its Pharma division, which is of more relevance to our inquiry,
includes infusion therapy, enteral nutrition (EN-nutrition administered
direct to the gut) and related homecare services. In the year to 31 December
1996 Fresenius AG's group sales were £1.25 billion and its net income
£45 million. Fresenius AG has already acquired three of the Caremark
group of companies (those in Canada, Germany and the Netherlands) from
the US company MedPartners Inc (MedPartners), and wishes to acquire the
UK company under the same purchase agreement.
For ten treatments or conditions which provide the great majority of
Caremark's business, the National Health Service (NHS) is virtually the
sole purchaser of homecare services in the UK. Services for five of these
treatments in England and Wales, and all ten in Scotland, are provided
in response to GP prescriptions, with the cost of the equipment and services
required being included in the price of the drugs or feeds. For the other
five treat-ments in England and Wales an instruction by the NHS Executive
in 1995 stated that the cost of equipment and services would no longer
be reimbursed against pre-scriptions. Instead Health Authorities (HAs)
should enter into con-tracts for the provision of the services either
with private sector providers or with hospital Trusts. One of the aims
of the change was to achieve better value for money by the encouragement
of competition among potential suppliers.
The five services now bought through contracts (contracted services)
can usefully be analysed as a single market, but there are also differences
between the services which mean that separate scru-tiny is warranted for
some of them. In principle the services still bought through prescriptions
(prescribed services) could also be in the same market because of simi-larities
in the services themselves and in the assets and skills required to provide
them, but in practice this method of funding ensures that suppliers of
drugs and feeds effectively deter-mine who will supply the services associated
with each treatment. Each therefore has to be considered separately.
In contracted services Caremark has 58 per cent of private sector supply
measured by the number of patient-days for which service was provided
in 1997 and 69 per cent measured by sales revenue. Fresenius's shares
on these measures were 5 and 6 per cent respectively. In the supply of
services for patients on parenteral nutrition (PN-nutrition administered
other than to the gut, normally by IV infusion), which is the main area
of overlap between them, Caremark's share was around 75 per cent and Fresenius's
8 per cent on both measures. NHS Trusts often provide homecare services
to their own patients but while this is a com-petitive factor in the market
it is not directly comparable with private sector supply. Among prescribed
services Caremark has had a substantial share in EN, providing homecare
services for Nutricia Ltd (Nutricia). Nutricia's decision to set up an
in-house service operation has resulted in a sharp decline in Caremark's
sales of EN services and these are likely to disappear by July 1998. Caremark
has about a one-third share of services for patients on immunoglobulin
treatment (IG) and effectively 100 per cent of the other three prescribed
services.
In contracted services Fresenius is one of only three private sector
suppliers, other than Caremark, with a significant share of the market.
In particular it is an important com-petitor in the supply of PN services
and in the absence of the merger is likely to become more active in the
other contracted services. There is therefore a clear loss of competition
from the merger. Barriers to entry (primarily reputational) are significant
and we do not expect com-petitive pressures from new entrants to build
up sufficiently quickly to offset this loss of competition. NHS provision
is not a major factor in the supply of PN services and, whilst it is more
important in relation to the other contracted services, we do not consider
it satisfactory that the NHS should have to rely on own-provision in order
to offset weakness in private sector competition caused by the merger.
NHS purchasing practice is evolving in ways which, in due course, might
enable the NHS to safeguard its position, but in the short to medium term
we do not expect developments which would offset the effect of a significant
reduction in competition. In our view the merger would make it harder
for the NHS to obtain value for money in purchasing PN services and in
some instances value for money would in fact deteriorate. We believe the
merger would also lead to a significant reduction in competi-tion for
the supply of other contracted services, compared with the situation which
would otherwise exist.
Among prescribed services there are possible ways in which, in the absence
of the merger, Caremark could find a new role in supplying homecare services
for EN patients, but these are too uncertain to influence our conclusions.
There is competition from several drug suppliers in the supply of IG services
and we do not expect the merger to have a significant impact in that area.
In the other three pre-scribed areas the drug suppliers are the key players.
Fresenius is a potential competitor to Caremark as a service provider
for them, but we con-sider it unlikely that the merger would result in
any increase in the price of drugs to the NHS.
Besides its effects on competition, the merger entails an element of
vertical integra-tion. We believe Fresenius would seek to use the acquisition
of Caremark to increase sales of its products and we expect that in the
contracted services market, as a result, the merger would reduce purchasers'
free-dom to choose the products and services which they judge best suited
to their needs.
We did not identify any benefits which might offset the adverse effects,
and we conclude that the proposed merger is against the public interest
because prices for the supply of contracted ser-vices, particularly for
PN patients, may be expected to be higher, quality of service lower and
choice of products and service supplier for the NHS reduced compared with
the situation which would exist in the absence of the merger.
We have considered various possible remedies for the adverse effects
but in our view there are no behavioural or structural remedies, short
of prohibiting the merger, which would be practicable and effective. We
believe that there would be other bidders for Caremark, some of which
would not give rise to the same objections as apply to the present merger.
The question whether prohibition of the merger would be disproportionate
to the adverse effects is, however, a cause for concern. The NHS could
in principle counter the adverse effects by deploying its purchasing power
and expertise in a more active and co-ordinated way. There are encouraging
signs that NHS purchasing is developing along the lines that would be
necessary but the desirabil-ity and cost of such changes are issues which
go well beyond consideration of this merger. The Secretary of State for
Trade and Industry may be able to form a clearer picture of the possibilities
for further reform of NHS purchas-ing by consulting the Secretaries of
State responsible for health, and it cannot be ruled out that this might
lead to fresh initiatives being taken. In the absence of such initiatives,
how-ever, we recommend that the merger be prohibited.
Full text
Contents
|
Part I
|
Summary and Conclusions
|
| Chapter 1 |
Summary |
| Chapter 2 |
Conclusions |
Part II
|
Background and evidence
|
| Chapter 3 |
The companies and the proposed merger |
| Chapter 4 |
The market |
| Chapter 5 |
Views of third parties |
| Chapter 6 |
Views of the main parties |
| |
List of signatories |
Appendices
|
|
| (The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
The reference and background |
| 3.1 |
Caremark: management accounts |
| 4.1 |
High-tech home healthcare treatments |
| 4.2 |
NHS Executive Letter EL(95)5 |
| Glossary |
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