Octagon Motorsports Limited and British Racing Drivers
Club Limited: A report on the merger situation
Summary of report (html format)
Full text (pdf format)
Adobe Acrobat Reader can be downloaded from http://www.adobe.com
Summary
Introduction
The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry asked us to investigate
the acquisition by Octagon Motorsports Limited (Octagon) of assets of
British Racing Drivers Club Limited (BRDC) (see Appendix 1.1 for our terms
of reference).
Octagon, formerly called Brands Hatch Leisure Group Limited (BHL), has
since November 1999 been a subsidiary of the Interpublic Group of Companies
Inc of the USA, a large advertising and marketing services company. Before
the BRDC acquisition, Octagon owned four licensed motor-racing circuits
in the UK, including Brands Hatch.
BRDC is a company limited by guarantee whose main objects are to provide
a members' club and promote British motor sport. It owns the Silverstone
motor-racing circuit.
The merger
In 1999 Octagon (then BHL) signed contracts with Formula One Administration
Limited (FOA) under which it would replace BRDC as promoter of the British
Grand Prix. Initially Octagon offered to acquire Silverstone from BRDC,
hoping to stage the race there, but BRDC refused its offer. Octagon then
applied for planning permission to upgrade Brands Hatch to Formula One
standards but its application was called in by the Secretary of State
for the Environment, Transport and the Regions with a view to his making
a decision following a pub-lic inquiry. The resulting delay would have
put Octagon in breach of its contract with FOA. Octagon therefore negotiated
the agreement with BRDC which is the subject of our inquiry.
Under the agreement Octagon was granted a 15-year lease of the Silverstone
circuit and took over the operation of the circuit from BRDC. Octagon
agreed to carry out an investment programme costing up to US$60 million
to upgrade Silverstone, which had been criticized by FOA for not keeping
up with current standards. It was agreed, however, that BRDC and FOA would
each contribute $20 million to the cost: BRDC through a reduction in rent
under the lease and FOA through a reduction in the fees which Octagon
had agreed to pay for the right to promote the British Grand Prix. FOA
also agreed to extend Octagon's contract to promote the race, previously
due to run from 2002 to 2007, to 2010.
The markets affected
Three product markets are affected by the merger: a downstream market
for the supply to final consumers of motorsport activities based at licensed
circuits; an upstream market for the supply of track time to organizations
offering motorsport activities to final consumers; and an upstream market
for the promotion of motorsport events at licensed circuits.
The downstream market has three segments:
- spectator events;
- participatory activities for consumers with their own vehicles; and
- participatory activities for consumers who are provided with vehicles
by the supplier of the activity.
The geographical extent of these downstream segments ranges from international
to national and local. Further, there are differences in the extent to
which consumers in these seg-ments see alternative leisure activities
as substitutes. The two upstream markets, by and large, operate on a national
basis.
Assessment of the merger's effects
As a result of the merger Octagon now controls five of the 18 licensed
circuits in the UK, including two of the best known. The merger has increased
Octagon's share of turnover from circuit operations from 28 to 72 per
cent. If the British Grand Prix is excluded from the figures, the increase
is from 39 to 60 per cent. Further, Silverstone is more important as a
competitor to Brands Hatch than the other way around because Brands Hatch
is relatively isolated from other circuits whereas Silverstone is not
far from three other circuits, which are operated by parties other than
Octagon. The merger has therefore given Octagon control of one of the
main rivals to Brands Hatch.
In order to assess the merger's effects on the public interest, we had
to consider what would have happened in the absence of the merger. It
was put to us that the merger had ensured that a round of the Formula
One championship would continue to be held in the UK. In our judgement,
however, if the merger agreement had not been reached, an alternative
arrangement, not involving a merger between Octagon and BRDC, was likely
to have been made to keep the British Grand Prix.
A sizeable proportion of the spectators at major motor-racing events
are likely to see other sporting and leisure activities as acceptable
substitutes for motorsport. This constrains the ability of circuit operators
to raise prices for major events. Smaller events are attended mainly by
enthusiasts and draw from a more limited geographical area. For such events,
however, Octagon could not raise prices at Silverstone above market rates
because of the competition that it faces from other circuits in the Midlands.
Given that the catchment areas of Silverstone and Brands Hatch overlap,
a constraint on prices at Brands Hatch would remain largely unchanged.
Accordingly, we consider that the merger does not significantly reduce
competition for spectators of motorsport events.
As regards customers for participatory activities, we consider that
motor-racing clubs, track-day organizers (TDOs) and teams wanting to carry
out testing have sufficient choice of venues to prevent Octagon acquiring
significant market power in the supply of circuits to these cat-egories
of customer. (The exception is Formula One teams, for which Silverstone
is cur-rently the only usable UK circuit, but that situation is not changed
by the merger.) Customers for experience days, who are primarily non-enthusiasts
for motor sport who visit a circuit on a one-off or occasional basis,
are likely to see the experience as one form of leisure activity among
a number which they would be happy to engage in. Moreover the provision
of these activities is not restricted to licensed circuits. There are
therefore ample substitutes on both the demand and supply sides for these
activities.
Octagon is vertically integrated in the supply of track days-when circuits
are opened to members of the public to drive their own vehicles-through
On Track, its in-house TDO. At present On Track organizes only one-fifth
of the track days held at Octagon circuits. There would be grounds for
concern if Octagon excluded other TDOs from its circuits and there have
been complaints that it has done so in some cases. However, the merger
makes only a small difference to the share of demand taken by Octagon-controlled
circuits.
Octagon is also vertically integrated in the promotion of motorsport
events through its involvement with British Motorsport Promoters Limited
(BMP), the most important domestic promoter, with two major car-racing
championships and one motorcycle championship in its portfolio. BMP is
jointly owned by operators of licensed circuits, and the ownership of
voting shares reflects the number of rounds of the three championships
which are held at each share-holder's circuit(s). The merger has resulted
in Octagon having a majority of the voting shares and formal control of
the company. However, in our view, Octagon was already in effective control
of BMP before the merger.
Conclusion
Accordingly, we have found that the merger will not give rise to adverse
effects and we conclude that it is not against the public interest. We
do, however, have some concerns for the future. These stem partly from
the combination of Octagon's horizontal strength in the control of licensed
circuits and its vertical links in the provision of track days and the
promotion of spectator events, though they potentially apply to other
circuit operators too. We propose that the Director General of Fair Trading
should review the operation of the relevant markets within five years.
There is also a more immediate need for improvements in some aspects of
the workings of BMP, which is the responsibility of both Octagon and the
other shareholders.
Full text
Contents
|
Part I
|
Summary and Conclusions
|
| Chapter
1 |
Summary |
| Chapter
2 |
Conclusions |
Part II
|
Background and evidence
|
| Chapter
3 |
The companies and the merger |
| Chapter
4 |
The relevant markets |
| Chapter
5 |
Views of the main parties |
| Chapter
6 |
Views of other interested parties |
| |
List of signatories |
Appendices
|
|
| (The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
The reference and background |
| 2.1 |
Statement of Issues and Hypothetical Remedies released
on 24 May 2001 |
| 3.1 |
Brief description of Interpublic |
| 3.2 |
BHL/Octagon: chronology, 1986 to July 2001 |
| 3.3 |
Octagon: consolidated balance sheets, 1996 to 2000 |
| 3.4 |
BRDC: consolidated profit and loss accounts, 1997 to
2001 |
| 3.5 |
BMP: the shareholders agreements, changes in the
Articles of Association and the allotment of redeemable
shares |
| 3.6 |
The right of a circuit to host a round in a BMP championship |
| 3.7 |
Summary of agreements between Silverstone Circuits Limited,
Silverstone Estates Limited and Octagon |
| 4.1 |
Octagon circuits |
| 4.2 |
Competitor (non-Octagon) circuits |
| 4.3 |
Circuit licences |
| 4.4 |
Parties involved in track-based motor sport |
| 4.5 |
Motorsport events |
| 4.6 |
Details of the BMP championships |
| 4.7 |
Table of championships and venues |
| 4.8 |
DotEcon analysis of customer databases |
| 4.9 |
Prices for track days |
| 4.10 |
The UK motorsport industry |
| Glossary |
|
Back to the top
|