Group 4 Falck A/S and The Wackenhut Corporation: A
report on the merger situation
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Summary
On 9 May 2002, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry referred
to us the acquisition by Group 4 Falck A/S (G4F) of The Wackenhut Corporation
(TWC). Our terms of reference are set out in Appendix 1.1. We were required
to report by 30 August 2002, subsequently extended to 27 September 2002.
G4F is a Danish company listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. The
company has three main business divisions: Global Solutions, Security
Services and Safety Services. In the UK, its subsidiary company, Group
4 Falck Global Solutions Limited (GSL), provides outsourced facility management
services for the public sector, including the provision of prison and
detention facilities and the transport of prisoners between courts and
prisons and between prisons. The Security Services division provides manned
guarding and aviation security, alarm and CCTV services. The Safety Services
division does not carry on any of its activities (ambulance, fire-fighting
and rescue services) in the UK.
G4F announced the acquisition of TWC on 8 March 2002, stating that this
was part of its strategy to become a global provider of security and security-related
services.
TWC is a Florida corporation whose shares were listed on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) prior to the acquisition. TWC provides security
and security-related services worldwide with a particular focus on North
and South America.
TWC's UK subsidiary, Wackenhut UK Ltd, provides custodial and facility
management services in the UK, including custodial and transport services
for the Home Office in respect of immigrant detainees. It also provides
certain airlines with manned guarding and other security-related services.
TWC's main involvement in custodial services in the UK comes through
the medium of Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (WCC), another Florida
corporation listed on the NYSE of which TWC owns 57 per cent. WCC's operations
in the UK are, in turn, carried out by a joint venture company, Premier
Custodial Group Limited (Premier), which is jointly owned and managed
by WCC and Serco Group plc (Serco). Premier provides outsourced custodial
services for the Home Office and the Scottish Executive including the
provision of prisons and immigrant detention centres, prisoner transport
services and the electronic monitoring of offenders.
We concluded that the CC had jurisdiction over the acquisition of TWC
by G4F, and that it qualified for investigation because the value of TWC's
assets acquired exceeded £70 million. For the purposes of our inquiry,
we defined the enlarged G4F group as consisting of G4F and its subsidiaries,
TWC and its subsidiaries and Premier.
Analysis of the impact of the acquisition on competition in the markets
relating to manned guarding, alarm and CCTV installation and monitoring
and aviation security led us to conclude that there was very little likelihood
that the enlarged G4F group would gain market power in any of these particular
markets and would therefore not be able to raise prices or lower quality
as a result of the acquisition. We concluded that no competition issues
were likely to arise from the acquisition in respect of these markets.
The other markets we investigated were four categories of custodial
market and the market for the provision of prisoner and immigrant detainee
transport where the supply of services by companies in the enlarged G4F
group overlap as a result of the acquisition. The four custodial markets
were the provision of services to Design, Construct, Manage and Finance
(DCMF) prisons; Management-only (MO) services for prison establishments;
MO services for immigrant detention centres (IDCs); and DCMF services
for Secure Training Centres (STCs). Both the Home Office and several of
G4F's competitors expressed concerns about the effect of the acquisition
on these custodial and transport markets. As a result of the acquisition,
companies in the enlarged G4F group hold the majority of the relevant
custodial and prisoner and immigrant detainee transport contracts. Other
indicators pointed to the possibility that the enlarged G4F group might
be able to exercise market power in these markets as a result of the acquisition.
In respect of two of these markets, namely those for prisoner and immigrant
detainee transport services and MO services for IDCs, we unanimously concluded
that the existence of competitive constraints (including strong inter-firm
rivalry, the threat of new entry and the potential use of countervailing
buyer power by the monopsony public sector purchasers) would be sufficient
to prevent companies in the enlarged G4F group winning future contracts
at a higher price or on the basis of a reduced quality of service than
would be the case before the acquisition. We concluded that no competition
issues were likely to arise from the acquisition either in respect of
the prisoner and immigrant detainee transport market or in respect of
MO services for IDCs.
On the other hand, as regards the DCMF prison market, the MO prison
market and the DCMF STC market, a majority among us had concerns that
the strength of competitive constraints in these markets would not be
sufficient to prevent the enlarged G4F group from exercising its market
power. That majority considered that whilst the Home Office and the Scottish
Executive, as monopsony purchasers of these services, had sufficient countervailing
power to induce new entry or revert to 'self-supply', there was not sufficient
evidence on which to form a reasonable expectation that the Home Office
and Scottish Executive would exercise such powers in practice. A minority
of us, on the other hand, considered that the monopsony purchasers had
both the potential and the willingness to deploy their countervailing
power in these markets in such a way as could be expected to protect the
public interest in the situation following the acquisition. We were therefore
divided in our views on the competitive constraints in these three markets
for custodial services operating on any likely market power which the
enlarged G4F group might have gained as a result of the acquisition.
We then considered the status of Premier. We examined whether it was
likely to continue to compete with GSL and other participants in the markets
with which we were concerned notwithstanding that Premier was a company
within the enlarged G4F group.
We took the view that an assessment of Premier's status following the
acquisition must depend upon a consideration of the terms and effectiveness
of the Safeguards Agreement and related agreements (which are governed
by the laws of the State of Florida), the likelihood of the parties' compliance
with those terms, and the nature of Premier itself as a 50:50 joint venture
company regulated by two Shareholders' Agreements (governed by the law
of England and Wales). We examined these factors against the background
that competitors of Premier and GSL might have a reduced incentive to
compete if they perceived that Premier and GSL were not to be regarded
as independent of each other. We took legal advice from a Florida law
firm on the applicable Florida law.
The legal advice we obtained on the Safeguards Agreement and related
agreements provided us with a considerable degree of reassurance that
Premier would continue to act independently from, and in competition with,
G4F. We separately considered whether there was any reason to be concerned
whether Premier and G4F might seek to cooperate with each other in the
relevant markets rather than to compete in them. We reached the conclusion
that the provisions of the Competition Act 1998 and Articles 81 and 82
of the EC Treaty would operate to deter any anti-competitive conduct of
that kind.
Our findings on the legal framework and on the commercial factors which
determine the ability of Premier to compete with G4F led us to conclude
that Premier was an independent competitor in the relevant markets and
would have the necessary resources to compete effectively.
We therefore unanimously concluded that there were no competition concerns
arising from G4F's acquisition of TWC in respect of the markets for DCMF
prison contracts, MO contracts for prison services and DCMF contracts
for STCs.
We are therefore unanimous in finding that the acquisition may be expected
not to lead to a significant reduction in competition in the markets for
the services affected by the acquisition. We conclude that the acquisition
may be expected not to operate against the public interest.
During our inquiry, we considered G4F's intentions to sell its interest
in WCC, recognizing that this would have the effect of removing all ties
between G4F and Premier. G4F had announced at the time of the acquisition
that it intended to sell its shareholding in WCC on the grounds that its
core business was security and safety services, not custodial and correctional
services. G4F told us that financial and legal advisers had been appointed
to handle the sale of its interest in WCC and that the disposal was intended
to be completed before Christmas 2002.
We formed a reasonable expectation that G4F's sale of its shareholding
in WCC would go ahead in the near future notwithstanding the current volatility
in the stock market and the uncertain outcome of a disputed claim by Serco
that it could now exercise a pre-emption right to acquire WCC's shareholding
in Premier. We unanimously concluded that a sale either to Serco or to
a third party should eliminate the concerns expressed by competitors relating
to the connection between G4F and Premier.
[ Details omitted. See note on page iv.
]
We furthermore concluded that the prospect [ Details
omitted. See note on page iv. ] would encourage [ %
] Premier to win contracts to enhance company values thereby promoting
competition within the enlarged G4F group.
We also believed that competition in all these markets could be further
enhanced if the public sector purchasers of the relevant services were
to exercise their buyer power more effectively. Our report sets out our
suggestions how this could be brought about.
Full text
Contents
|
Part I
|
Summary and Conclusions
|
| Chapter 1 |
Summary |
| Chapter 2 |
Conclusions |
Part II
|
Background and evidence
|
| Chapter 3 |
The UK security and security-related industry |
| Chapter 4 |
The acquisition and the companies involved |
| Chapter 5 |
Analysis of the relevant markets |
| Chapter 6 |
Views of the main party |
| Chapter 7 |
Views of third parties |
| |
List of signatories |
Appendices
|
|
| (The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
The reference and background |
| 3.1 |
Current custodial institution contracts |
| 3.2 |
Current prisoner and immigrant detainee transport contracts |
| 4.1 |
Group 4 Total Security Ltd: profit and loss accounts
and balance sheets, 1999 to 2001 |
| 4.2 |
Group 4 Falck Global Solutions Limited: consolidated
profit and loss Accounts and balance sheets, 2000 and 2001 |
| 4.3 |
Wackenhut UK Ltd: consolidated profit and loss accounts
and balance sheets, 1999 to 2001 |
| 4.4 |
Premier Custodial Group Limited: consolidated profit
and loss accounts and balance sheets, 1999 to 2001 |
| 6.1 |
WCC Safeguards Agreement of 7 March 2002 |
| Glossary |
|
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