Vodafone, O2, Orange and T-Mobile: Reports on references
under section 13 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 on the charges made
by Vodafone, O2, Orange and T-Mobile for terminating calls from fixed
and mobile networks.
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Summary
On 7 January 2002 the Director General of Telecommunications (the DGT)
made two references to us in exercise of his powers under section 13 of
the Telecommunications Act 1984 (the Act). One reference concerned the
charges made by Vodafone Limited (Vodafone) and BT Cellnet Limited (BT
Cellnet), and the other reference the charges made by Orange Personal
Communications Services Limited (Orange) and Mercury Personal Communications
Limited (One2One ), to operators of fixed or mobile public telecommunications
systems for the termination of calls to handsets connected to their respective
mobile networks. Under each reference, we are required to investigate
and report on whether these termination charges would, in the absence
of a charge control mechanism on them, be set at levels which operate,
or may be expected to operate, against the public interest, and if so,
whether the effects adverse to the public interest could be remedied or
prevented by modifications to the licences of one or more of the four
mobile network operators (MNOs) concerned. The full terms of reference
are set out in Appendix 1.1.
Following a review of the current control of the call termination charges
of O2 (UK) Limited (O2) and Vodafone, the DGT announced in a press release
dated 12 December 2001 that, in his view, mobile termination charges were
substantially in excess of costs; and that he had proposed charge caps
of RPI-12 each year for four years until 31 March 2006 on the call termination
rates, not only of O2 and Vodafone, whose average charges had been at
the maximum level permitted under the cap for the whole period of their
existing charge control, but also of Orange and T-Mobile (UK) Limited
(T?Mobile), whose unregulated charges had consistently been above those
of Vodafone and O2 over the same period. The four MNOs had objected to
the proposed charge controls, however, and the DGT therefore referred
the matter to us. Both references are in similar terms and we therefore
decided to investigate the two references in parallel, with the same Group
of CC members.
Our investigation concerned the call termination charges which O2, Vodafone,
Orange and T-Mobile levy on each other for terminating calls on their
respective networks ('off-net calls') and on fixed network operators (FNOs),
of which the largest is BT, for terminating fixed-to-mobile calls on their
networks. Call termination charges are incurred by the MNOs and FNOs as
costs at the wholesale level, and are taken into account in the retail
prices which they set for their own customers. FNOs' call termination
charges are separately regulated and are much lower than the termination
charges levied by the MNOs. Calls to mobiles from FNOs accounted for a
much larger proportion (70 per cent) of termination minutes than off-net
calls (about 30 per cent) in 2001/02 (mobile-to-mobile, or on-net calls,
do not attract termination charges), and provided nearly all the MNOs'
net revenue from call termination charges in that year. This is because
the MNOs pay out in termination charges to other MNOs (for off-net calls)
broadly what they earn in termination revenue from other MNOs, and so
the net revenue they receive from other MNOs or the net amount they pay
to them is small compared with the call termination revenue they receive
from fixed-to-mobile calls.
We found that each MNO has a monopoly of call termination on its own
network. This is because there are currently no practical technological
means of terminating a call other than on the network of the MNO to which
the called party subscribes and none that seems likely to become commercially
viable in the near future. There are also no ready substitutes for calling
a mobile phone at the retail level, such as calling a fixed line instead.
We considered whether competitive pressures on the MNOs at the retail
level constrained call termination charges in any way, or forced the MNOs
to pass on excess termination revenues to retail customers through lower
prices. We concluded that competitive pressures at the retail level did
not constrain termination charges. There is vigorous competition among
the MNOs to attract and sign up subscribers to their networks, for example
through the payment of incentives and discounts to retailers, and handset
subsidies to customers, but this is funded by excess returns from termination
charges. We found that this structure of incentives put in place by the
MNOs distorts the volume and direction of traffic on the network, leading
to a distorted pattern of usage by consumers. We found less evidence of
effective competition in call origination: thus the MNOs appear to display
at least some power to set price structures that suit them for on-net
and off-net calls.
In the light of arguments put to us by the MNOs, the DGT and others,
we concluded that termination charges should in principle be cost-reflective
and that the most appropriate method for determining the costs of termination
was long-run incremental costs (LRIC). Some costs, however, are fixed
and common to outgoing and incoming calls, and we allocated those costs
on the basis that, because call termination charges are ultimately borne
by the caller, the only costs that should be allowed should be those costs
that the caller himself causes (which we term 'the cost-causation principle').
We concluded that the call termination charges of the MNOs were well in
excess of a 'fair charge', this being based on the LRIC of call termination
(including fixed and common network costs) and a mark-up for relevant
non-network costs. We also concluded that there should be a small mark-up
for the network externality, a justified addition to the fair charge because
the caller benefits from having a large, accessible pool of people to
call and be called by, and should make a contribution to the recruitment
and retention of marginal subscribers. The MNOs argued that the costs
of call termination should be calculated on a demand-led ('Ramsey') basis,
but we rejected such an approach, as it would breach the cost-causation
principle. Further, we concluded that the MNOs would, in practice, set
neither the correct structure nor the level of retail prices in accordance
with Ramsey principles if we were to set termination charges at Ramsey
levels; hence, implementing Ramsey pricing would require us to set retail
prices, and we do not believe it would be appropriate for us to attempt
to do so; and, in any case, there are formidable problems associated with
computing correct Ramsey prices.
It was put to us by the MNOs that, because most people now have a mobile
phone, what consumers lose in paying high termination charges they gain
on cheap handsets and competitively priced on-net calls. We rejected those
arguments. Some callers to mobiles from fixed-line telephones or from
payphones do not themselves own a mobile phone, and so subsidize mobile
customers through high call termination charges, with almost no reciprocal
benefit. Moreover, to the extent that callers with both fixed and mobile
phones use their fixed lines to call mobiles more than they use their
mobile phone, they suffer a detriment due to the high termination charges
of the MNOs. The high prices of fixed-to-mobile, and low prices of on-net,
calls also tend to skew usage from the lower-cost (that is, fixed) technology
to the higher-cost (that is, mobile) technology.
We conclude that the termination charges of O2, Vodafone, Orange and
T-Mobile operate against the public interest, with the adverse effects
that termination charges in 2002/03 are 30 to 40 per cent in excess of
our estimation of the fair charge; and that, in the absence of a charge
control on them, the termination charges of O2, Vodafone, Orange and T-Mobile
may be expected to operate against the public interest, with the adverse
effect that termination charges may be expected to be up to double the
level of the fair charge by 2005/06, if such charges were retained at
their current levels in real terms. As a result, the following detriments
occur and may be expected over at least the next three years to occur:
(a) the costs incurred by the FNOs and the MNOs through paying
mobile call termination charges that are in excess of the fair charge
are wholly or mainly passed through by them into their customer tariffs,
with the result that consumers pay too much for fixed-to-mobile and off-net
calls;
(b) the high price of fixed-to-mobile calls discourages such
calls and, as a result, too few such calls are made, thereby distorting
patterns of telephone use;
(c) consumers who make more fixed-to-mobile or off-net calls
than on-net calls unfairly subsidize those who mainly receive calls on
their mobile phones or who mainly make on-net calls, or who make little
use of their mobile phones;
(d) the excess charges for termination have the further effect
that they serve to encourage or facilitate significant distortions in
competition because MNOs are not obliged to charge and subscribers are
not obliged to pay the economic cost of handsets. This leads to the undervaluation
of mobile phone handsets by the MNOs' customers combined with a greater
turnover ('churn') than would take place if customers paid charges which
reflected the proper valuation of such handsets. This leads to yet further
distortions in greater expenditure in mobile customer acquisition than
would have taken place if termination charges reflected costs more closely
and if handset costs reflected the costs of handsets more closely; and
(e) the higher prices of calls from fixed to mobile phones and
the lower price of on-net mobile calls encourage greater use of the higher-cost
(mobile) technology at the expense of the lower-cost (fixed) alternative.
We did not find that there were, or that there might be expected to
be, any offsetting public interest benefits arising from the termination
charges set by the four MNOs being in excess of the fair charge, which
could justify their continuation. We considered a number of possible remedies
to address the adverse effects, and concluded that a charge control by
way of a price cap, based on the relevant LRIC of the call termination
service of an MNO with a 20 per cent market share, plus the appropriate
mark-ups as set out in paragraph 1.6, was the only remedy likely to address
them effectively. The price cap can be expressed as an RPI-X formula applied
to the weighted average termination charge of the MNOs and would take
the form of a 15 per cent reduction in their termination charges over
the period from 1 April to 25 July 2003 and then a progressive reduction
to the fair charge by 31 March 2006. This proposal, which is proportionate
to the detriments and non-discriminatory, would remedy the adverse effects
we have identified by removing their root cause.
In our view, this approach is both right and fair. It addresses the
adverse effects through a methodology that is equitable, because it attributes
costs on the basis of who causes them. If termination charges are regulated
on this basis, it should mean that:
(a) consumers do not pay too much for fixed-to-mobile or off-net
calls;
(b) consumers who make more fixed-to-mobile or off-net calls
than on-net calls, or who make more off-net calls than they receive, will
not unfairly subsidize other consumers;
(c) cost-reflective call charges should minimize distortion in
the volumes and patterns of calling;
(d) there should be no displacement from less resource-intensive
to more resource-intensive technology; and
(e) there will be less incentive for the MNOs to subsidize handset
acquisition, which should reduce the rate of replacement of handsets.
The DGT's proposed licence modification sought to regulate termination
charges within the period to 31 March 2006. However, the falling away
of the current framework of telecommunications regulation as the result
of the coming into effect of new telecommunications Directives on 25 July
2003 means that any licence modification we recommend will have a very
short life. In our view, a period of three years is more suitable for
regulatory assessment than the shorter period required by the change of
regime. Consequently, in carrying out our inquiry, we used the longer
period for the purposes of our analysis of the mobile market and the likely
developments in that market. Moreover, the DGT asked us to state our views
on the level at which termination charges should be set for periods beyond
July 2003. In our view, the analysis we have carried out enables us to
take a view of the levels at which charges should be set for the period
to March 2006 and, notwithstanding that such views can have little more
than persuasive effect, we have decided to state our views on the level
at which we think call termination charges should be set to 31 March 2006.
Accordingly, we recommend that:
(a) For each of O2, Vodafone, Orange and T-Mobile, there should
be two price caps, set at the same level, one regulating termination charges
for fixed-to-mobile calls and the other, termination charges for off-net
calls. In this way, the MNOs cannot load charges disproportionately on
to one or other call type.
(b) O2, Vodafone, Orange and T-Mobile should each be required
to reduce the level of its average termination charge by 15 per cent in
real terms before 25 July 2003.
(c) O2 and Vodafone should be subject to further reductions in
their average termination charges of RPI-15 in each of the periods 25
July 2003 to 31 March 2004; 1 April 2004 to 31 March 2005; and 1 April
2005 to 31 March 2006.
(d) Orange and T-Mobile should be subject to further reductions
in their average termination charges of RPI-14 in each of the periods
25 July 2003 to 31 March 2004; 1 April 2004 to 31 March 2005 and 1 April
2005 to 31 March 2006.
The precise effect of our recommendations on the MNOs and consumers
is dependent on the extent to which the MNOs seek to recover the reduction
in revenue from capped termination charges by price changes in the retail
sector. As the result of our recommendations, however:
(a) We expect welfare gains of between around £325 million
and around £700 million over the period of our recommended charge
control.
(b) We do not expect average retail prices to increase. The MNOs
need not increase their retail prices to restore revenue lost through
the capping of termination charges, as their business plans project a
continued downward trend in retail prices and they could recoup these
revenues by reducing the rate of retail price reductions for a period.
(c) As we anticipate no increase in retail prices, we expect no
significant loss of mobile subscribers. Even if handset subsidies are
reduced, people already owning mobile phones are unlikely to leave the
network unless their handset is lost, stolen or broken. The MNOs have
the option to offer marginal subscribers cheaper packages to induce them
to stay on the network once that happens.
(d) No threat is posed to the financial viability of the MNOs.
The MNOs have had notice of the possibility of charge controls on termination
charges since at least September 2001 and their business plans all assume
some reduction in termination charges over the next three years.
Full text
Contents |
Volume 1
|
Summary and Conclusions
|
Part I
|
Summary and Conclusions
|
| Chapter 1 |
Summary |
| Chapter 2 |
Conclusions |
Volume 2
|
Background Chapters 3-15
|
Part II
|
Background and evidence
|
| Chapter 3 |
Mobile telephony |
| Chapter 4 |
The legal and regulatory framework to the references |
| Chapter 5 |
The financial position of the MNOs |
| Chapter 6 |
Mobile services at the retail and wholesale levels |
| Chapter 7 |
The cost of calls to mobile phones |
| Chapter 8 |
Ramsey prices and externalities |
| Chapter 9 |
Proposed price cap and its impact |
| Chapter 10 |
Views of the DGT |
| Chapter 11 |
Views of O2 |
| Chapter 12 |
Views of Orange |
| Chapter 13 |
Views of T-Mobile (UK) |
| Chapter 14 |
Views of Vodafone |
| Chapter 15 |
Views of third parties |
| |
List of signatories |
Volume 3
|
Appendices
|
| (The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
Terms of reference and conduct of the inquiry |
| 2.1 |
Statement of issues |
| 2.2 |
Statement of hypothetical remedies |
| 3.1 |
Technological solutions to provide pressure on call termination
charges |
| 5.1 |
Vodafone Group: summary group profit and loss accounts
for the two years to 31 March 2002; and balance sheet as
at 31 March 2002 |
| 5.2 |
mmO2: group profit and loss accounts for the two years
to 31 March 2002, and balance sheet as at 31 March 2002 |
| 5.3 |
France Telecom: profit and loss accounts for the two
years to 31 December 2001, and balance sheet as at 31 December
2001 |
| 5.4 |
Orange SA: profit and loss accounts for the two years
to 31 December 2001, and balance sheet as at 31 December
2001 |
| 5.5 |
Deutsche Telecom: group profit and loss accounts for
the two years to 31 December 2001, and balance sheet as
at 31 December 2001 |
| 5.6 |
[Details omitted. See note on page v.] |
| 5.7 |
Vodafone UK: arguments for adjustment in the treatment
of operating leases when calculating its ROCE |
| 5.8 |
[Details omitted. See note on page v.] |
| 5.9 |
[Details omitted. See note on page v.] |
| 5.10 |
[Details omitted. See note on page v.] |
| 5.11 |
[Details omitted. See note on page v.] |
| 5.12 |
[Details omitted. See note on page v.] |
| 5.13 |
[Details omitted. See note on page v.] |
| 5.14 |
[Details omitted. See note on page v.] |
| 5.15 |
[Details omitted. See note on page v.] |
| 5.16 |
[Details omitted. See note on page v.] |
| 6.1 |
Charges for customers, May 2002 |
| 6.2 |
BMRB report, pricing structures, July 2002 |
| 6.3 |
Handset prices, May 2002 |
| 6.4 |
Monthly subscription charges and inclusive minutes per
month for contract subscribers for each MNO, May 2002 |
| 6.5 |
[Details omitted. See note on page v.] |
| 7.1 |
Reproduction of the CC's guidance to the four MNOs in
order for them to calculate the costs per incoming call
minutes, based on their UK financial statements |
| 7.2 |
Vodafone: CC summary of its top-down estimate of the
cost of incoming calls per minute for the year to 31 March
2001 |
| 7.3 |
O2-CC summary of its top-down estimate of the cost of
incoming calls per minute for the year to 31 March 2001 |
| 7.4 |
Orange: CC summary of its top-down estimate of the cost
of incoming calls per minute for the year to 31 December
2001, and an alternative approach proposed by Orange |
| 7.5 |
T-Mobile: CC summary of its top-down estimate of the
cost of incoming calls per minute for the year to 31 December
2001 |
| 7.6 |
Vodafone-summary of its reasons for inclusion of non-network
costs in incoming calls costs |
| 7.7 |
O2 summary of its reasons for inclusion of non-network
costs in incoming calls costs |
| 7.8 |
Orange: summary of its reasons for inclusion of non-network
costs in incoming calls costs |
| 7.9 |
T-Mobile: summary of its reasons for inclusion of non-network
costs in incoming calls costs |
| 7.10 |
Oftel-summary of its position on the inclusion of non-network
costs in incoming calls costs |
| 7.11 |
[Details omitted. See note on page v.] |
| 7.12 |
[Details omitted. See note on page v.] |
| 7.13 |
[Details omitted. See note on page v.] |
| 7.14 |
[Details omitted. See note on page v.] |
| 7.15 |
[Details omitted. See note on page v.] |
| 7.16 |
Estimates of cost of capital |
| 8.1 |
Calculating of maximum justified externality surcharge |
| 8.2 |
Survey data |
| 8.3 |
Demographic characteristics of key groups in BMRBI and
BMRB2 surveys |
| 8.4 |
The MNOs' customer acquisition costs |
| 8.5 |
BMRB report: valuing network externality, September 2002 |
| 9.1 |
Modelling of the call termination charge |
| 9.2 |
One method used to analyse the welfare effects of a price
cap using the parties' models |
| 9.3 |
Consumer surplus |
| Glossary |
|
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