Carlton Communications Plc /
Granada Plc: A report on the proposed merger.
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Summary
On 16 October 2002, Carlton Communications Plc (Carlton)
and Granada plc (Granada) announced an agreed merger, which
they believed would pave the way for a fully consolidated
ITV and create a company that would be one of the leading
commercial broadcasters in Europe. They said that the main
objective of the merger was to remove the current dysfunctionality
within ITV, and allow ITV to remain an effective player in
the competition for viewers and advertisers, in a rapidly
changing competitive environment. There were also significant
cost savings to be realized by merging the two companies.
The Communications Act 2003, which received royal assent on
17 July 2003, allows the merger to be completed.
On 11 March 2003 the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
referred the proposed merger between Carlton and Granada to
the Competition Commission (CC). Following an extension, we
were asked to report by 26 August 2003. Our terms of reference
are set out in Appendix 1.1.
Television is a sector undergoing major change. Technological
developments have led to a rapid increase in the channels
available, and in the number of households able to receive
them. This has had a major impact on ITV. In 2003, it is forecast
to receive just over half of all television advertising revenue,
down from 60 per cent in 1999. Its audience share has fallen
from 55 per cent to around 40 per cent of viewers of commercial
television over the same period, a decline that has mainly
been to the benefit of the multi-channel broadcasters and
Channel 5. Multi-channel penetration is likely to continue
to grow as a result of the continuing progress of the satellite
and cable companies, the successful launch of Freeview, and
the Government’s announced intention to close down analogue
transmissions by the end of the decade. Forecasts suggest
that ITV’s share of advertising revenue may fall to
around 45 per cent by 2007.
We looked at a number of areas of concern relating to the
proposed merger: the independent production of television
programmes, the availability of studio facilities in the North
of England, the future competition for ITV licences, the impact
on the other ITV regional licensees, and the sale of advertising
airtime.
We did not expect the merger to operate against the public
interest in the areas of programme production, the availability
of studio facilities, or the future competition for ITV licences.
We considered two potential issues relating to the other
ITV regional licensees: the ITV networking arrangements and
the arrangements for the sale of their airtime. On networking
arrangements, we concluded that, without additional safeguards
currently under negotiation between Carlton and Granada, the
other licensees and the Independent Television Commission
(ITC), the proposed merger might be expected to operate against
the public interest in this area. As for the sale of their
advertising airtime, a merger that resulted in a single ITV
sales house would remove from the other regional licensees
the choice that they currently have to contract with either
the Carlton or Granada sales house for this purpose. We concluded
that, unless the other licensees could continue to sell their
airtime through the merged entity’s sales house on terms
similar to those that they currently enjoyed, the proposed
merger would have an adverse effect on them, and so might
be expected to operate against the public interest.
Our major focus was on the effect of the proposed merger
on the sale of Carlton’s and Granada’s airtime.
We concluded that the relevant economic market for this purpose
was television advertising as a whole, and the relevant geographic
market, the UK.
We concluded that the proposed merger would have an adverse
effect on future competition for the sale of advertising airtime
and so might be expected to operate against the public interest.
We considered that London was the primary focus of competition
within ITV, but believed that there was some competition between
ITV regions outside London. Our view was that competition
between Carlton and Granada limited what advertisers or media
buyers could be charged by, in particular, limiting the advertising
budget commitment that could be demanded for a given level
of discount.
Competition between ITV and the other commercial channels
had to be viewed in the context of a further decline in ITV
since our last report on independent television companies
in 2000. Despite this decline, we did not believe that other
channels were yet sufficiently close substitutes to prevent
an increase in the advertising budget commitment that ITV
could demand for a given level of discount, following the
removal of competition between Carlton and Granada. Whilst
the analysis carried out by the parties, demonstrating equivalent
levels of coverage with and without ITV, appeared to be technically
correct, other considerations, such as the difficulty of purchasing
enough slots to achieve the required coverage, and the likelihood
of obtaining a lower sales uplift without ITV, would act as
a barrier to switching for at least some advertisers. We were
also told that ITV provided a number of ‘must have’
features, including the unique ability to attract big audiences
for advertisers, a consistently high audience share in the
evening peak, a very high proportion of prestigious programmes,
and the ability to attract ‘light’ viewers. Some
customers might also be deterred from marginal switching to
other commercial channels as this might attract punitive reductions
in discount they currently received from ITV. We did not accept
that buyer power would prevent the merged entity from raising
prices.
The adverse effects which we thought were likely to arise
from this lessening of competition would centre on the enhanced
market position of a merged Carlton/Granada. In terms of advertising
sales, this might manifest itself in a number of ways, including
in particular the parties’ ability, post-merger, to:
(a) insist on terms that were generally less attractive
to advertisers or media buyers. This might include demanding
a greater level of commitment, however expressed, of their
television advertising budgets for a given level of discount
off the station average price (SAP) or obliging advertisers
or media buyers to accept worse terms and in particular reduced
discounts;
(b) enhance the degree of price discrimination;
and/or
(c) change the system under which television advertising
airtime was sold to the advantage of the merged entity.
We expected that these adverse effects might allow the merged
entity to achieve a higher level of revenue than if the merger
had not gone ahead. This would be most likely to be to the
detriment of advertisers and the other commercial broadcasters.
We saw benefits in the proposed merger in terms of broadcasting,
programming and the competition for viewers, but, in the light
of the adverse effects identified, we concluded that it could
be expected to operate against the public interest in relation
both to the other ITV regional licensees and to future competition
for the sale of advertising airtime. We therefore went on
to consider a number of possible remedies as alternatives
to the outright prohibition of the merger.
As for the other ITV licensees and the ITV network, we concluded
that, as a condition of the proposed merger going ahead, Carlton
and Granada should undertake to agree to a package of safeguards
proposed by the ITC, and should accept any relevant changes
to licence conditions that followed from them. On airtime
sales arrangements, assuming that the merger resulted in a
single Carlton/Granada sales house, we concluded that Carlton
and Granada should give an undertaking that the other ITV
licensees should have the option to carry forward, for the
duration of the companies’ respective licences, the
terms currently in effect between each of them and Carlton’s
and Granada’s sales houses, which had been independently
agreed in competitive tenders.
We consulted widely on four potential remedies relating
to advertising sales:
(a) prohibition of share deals;
(b) commoditization of airtime;
(c) divestment of one or both of Carlton’s
and Granada’s sales houses; and
(d) contract rights renewal (CRR).
We did not believe that either the prohibition of share
deals or the commoditization of airtime would be effective
remedies. We also concluded that keeping one internal sales
house and selling off the other, including the proposal to
outsource LWT sales, would not be effecttive.
We considered both the divestment of two sales houses, and
the CRR remedy, in some detail.
The two sales houses would be run as independent entities,
with their own back-office functions. Airtime would be divided
along current lines. They would receive an annual fee from
ITV to cover their basic running costs and an incentive scheme
would be designed to motivate each house to compete. There
would need to be quality of service guarantees. We would expect
this remedy to be in place for a minimum of three years.
We saw both advantages and disadvantages with this remedy.
It had the virtue of preserving the pre-merger market structure
in terms of airtime sales, rather than relying on other types
of intervention to mitigate the adverse effects. We also believed
that it would be possible to devise incentives to encourage
the two sales houses to compete and to maintain an adequate
level of performance. Our greatest concern, however, was ensuring
that the merged entity, which would be the ultimate owner
of the airtime being sold, would not be able to exert excessive
influence or a degree of control over the independent sales
houses. We also had some concerns about divorcing the broadcasting
company from its principal source of income.
The CRR remedy is designed to give all existing customers
the fallback option of renewing the terms of their 2003 contracts
without change for the duration of the remedy, with the exception
that where a contract specified a share of broadcast, this
share would vary in direct proportion to ITV’s share
of commercial impacts, subject to a cap at the initial share.
The protection could be rolled forward such that a subsequent
year’s contract became the base set of contractual terms,
subject to mutual agreement. Customers would not be precluded
from negotiating different deals if they wished.
Advertisers would be able to switch between media buyers
and benefit from the protection of the ‘new’ media
buyer’s base contract, subject to safeguards to protect
Carlton/Granada against the risk of overtrading; new advertisers
would be protected by a media buyer’s base contract;
lapsed advertisers would have the right of renewal of the
terms of their most recent contract in force since 2000; and
rights would not expire if advertisers chose to move away
from ITV for a period of time during the remedy. The remedy
would cover all airtime sales referred to in the 2003 contracts,
including sales on behalf of the other ITV regional licensees
as well as, in some cases, ITV2 and ITV News.
To ensure the successful implementation of this remedy,
Carlton and Granada should fund an independent adjudicator
(or a small panel), selected by the ITC. The adjudicator would
deal in the first instance with issues of contract fairness,
enforcement or interpretation, as well as with any issues
associated with potential overtrading. His or her decisions
would be binding on the parties. Additional undertakings would
be needed to prevent material changes to the current airtime
sales system for the duration of the remedy. We would expect
this remedy to be in place for a minimum of three years.
Four of us believed that the strength of this remedy was
that it addressed, in a direct way, our concerns about the
merged entity’s increased market power, in particular
with regard to being able to extract a higher advertising
budget commitment for a given level of discount, to increase
any existing price discrimination against more vulnerable
customers, and to change the current mechanism for airtime
sales in ways that could disadvantage ITV’s customers
and the other commercial channels. Such an arrangement seemed
to us to be particularly well suited to dealing with competitive
concerns that may reduce over time with the increasing penetration
of digital and multi-channel television and in an already
highly regulated industry.
The four of us considered both the CRR remedy and the divestment
of the two sales houses to be potentially effective remedies,
but concluded that the CRR remedy would place a lesser burden
on the parties and was thus the more appropriate.
One of us, Mrs Brown, dissented from this view and considered
that the divestment of the two sales houses was the only effective
remedy to address the adverse effects on advertising sales.
We all concluded that as effective remedies had been identified,
the prohibition of the merger would be disproportionate.
So, in sum, on the position of the other ITV regional licensees
we concluded that:
(a) without additional safeguards on ITV networking
arrangements, the proposed merger might be expected to operate
against the public interest; and
(b) on the sale of their national advertising airtime,
unless the other licensees could continue to sell through
the merged entity’s sales house on terms similar to
those that they currently enjoyed, a merger that resulted
in a single Carlton/Granada sales house might be expected
to operate against the public interest.
(c) As for its effect on future competition for
the sale of advertising airtime, we concluded that the proposed
merger might be expected to operate against the public interest.
As for remedies, we concluded that:
— On (a), Carlton and Granada should agree
to a package of safeguards proposed by the ITC, and should
accept any relevant changes to licence conditions that followed
from them.
— On (b), if the merger resulted in a single
Carlton/Granada sales house, Carlton and Granada should give
an undertaking that the other ITV licensees should have the
option to carry forward, for the duration of the companies’
respective licences, the terms currently in effect between
each of them and Carlton’s and Granada’s sales
houses.
— On (c), four of us considered both the
CRR remedy and the divestment of the two sales houses to be
potentially effective, but that, as it would place a lesser
burden on the parties, the CRR remedy was the more appropriate.
Although it lay beyond the CC’s terms of reference
on the present occasion, we all believed that the Office of
Fair Trading or the ITC/Office of Communications should look
at other features relating to the sale of airtime that have
caused us disquiet and consider undertaking a review of the
wider market, with a view to ascertaining whether the nature
of the deals struck, the trading mechanisms, and the overall
market structure substantially lessen competition in the sale
of airtime on commercial television, and how the system might
be changed to enable it to operate more effectively and competitively.
Full text
Contents |
Part I |
Summary and Conclusions |
| Chapter 1 |
Summary |
| Chapter 2 |
Conclusions |
Part II |
Background and evidence |
| Chapter 3 |
Television broadcasting |
| Chapter 4 |
The companies and the merger situation |
| Chapter 5 |
Analysis of the relevant markets |
| Chapter 6 |
Views of Carlton and Granada |
| Chapter 7 |
Views of other parties |
| |
List of signatories |
Appendices |
|
| (The numbering of the appendices indicates
the chapters to which they relate) |
| 1.1 |
The reference and background |
| 3.1 |
Transmission mechanisms and signal technologies |
| 4.1 |
Carlton: history, activities and group structure |
| 4.2 |
Carlton: group profit and loss accounts, 1998 to 2002 |
| 4.3 |
Carlton: group balance sheets, 1998 to 2002 |
| 4.4 |
Carlton: group cash flows, 1998 to 2002 |
| 4.5 |
Granada: history, activities and group structure |
| 4.6 |
Granada: group profit and loss accounts, 1998 to 2002 |
| 4.7 |
Granada: group balance sheets, 1998 to 2002 |
| 4.8 |
Granada: group cash flows, 1998 to 2002 |
| 4.9 |
Carlton and Granada: broadcasting and content divisional
profitability, 1998 to 2002 |
| 4.10 |
ITV networking arrangements and ITV Network Limited |
| 5.1 |
Forecasts of ITV performance |
| 5.2 |
Analysis of contracts |
| 5.3 |
Discounts off SAP |
| 5.4 |
Television audiences |
| Glossary |
|
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